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The thesis argues that significant incentives and sufficient means
exist for the United States to further develop advanced conventional
weapons to accomplish missions previously reserved for nuclear
weapons on both the tactical and strategic levels of warfare. This
conclusion is based on a survey of (a) apparent incentives for an
increased reliance on advanced extended-range conventional
weapons, (b) potential capabilities and limitations of such weapons,
and (c) possible strategic implications of a greater emphasis on such
weapons. Incentives examined include (a) the delegitimization of
nuclear deterrence, (b) environmental, technical, and safety concerns
associated with nuclear weapons, (c) the declining credibility of
threats to use nuclear weapons in military operations in the more
probable strategic contingencies in the foreseeable future, and (d)
the more credible threat of discriminate advanced conventional
weapons. Currently available weapons technology can be developed
to strike a broad range of targets previously thought vulnerable only
to nuclear weapons at costs competitive with nuclear arms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 40-plus years of the Cold War the military
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were aimed
at each other for purposes of deterrence and coercion. The
nuclear forces of the United States bore an important share of
the responsibility to deter attack on the United States and
its vital interests. U.S. nuclear forces were used not only
to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack on the United State.
and its vital interests, but also to influence the decision-
making of adversaries, as was the case in Korea and Berlin
under President Eisenhower.
With the end of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union some have questioned whether any realistic
threats to the United States and its vital interest exist
anymore. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world,
however, has not eliminated all threats to the United States
or its vital interest; the threats have simply become more
diffuse. In such a changed world environment can the United
States continue to rely so heavily on its nuclear arsenal to
deter its potential enemies?
In the last decade of the Soviet/American confrontation
some experts in the United States and the Soviet Union
observed that advanced conventional weapons could potentially
perform certain missions previously assigned to nuclear
1
weapons. Proponents of such a move perceived several benefits
in the replacement of nuclear weapons by advanced conventional
weapons in the areas of morality, damage limitation,
escalation control, and war termination. If these advantages
existed in the era of Soviet/American confrontation, clearly
many of the same advantages would also apply in the new
multipolar world. In light of changes in the types and scope
of threats to the United States, two questions need to be
addressed. Should the United States continue to develop
advanced conventional weapons for missions previously assigned
to nuclear weapons? Is a greater reliance on "conventional
deterrence" possible?
A. THESIS
The thesis examined here is that significant incentives
and sufficient means exist for the United States to further
develop advanced conventional weapons to accomplish missions
previously reserved for nuclear weapons both on the tactical
and strategic levels of warfare. For the past forty-plus years
the term strategic has been synonymous with nuclear. The
following pages will show that strategic conflict can and will
include advanced conventional weapons. The thesis will show
that, because of the maturation of a number of key
technologies, the substitution of advanced conventional
weapons for many missions reserved for nuclear weapons is now
both possible and desirable.
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Before one can justify the cest associated with the
research, development, and deployment of advanced conventional
weapons, one must ask several salient questions:
-- Are there reasons for lessening American reliance on
nuclear weapons? Are advanced conventional strategic
capabilities desirable?
-- What are the probable consequences of non-nuclear
strategic weapons on deterrence?
-- Are advanced conventional strategic capabilities feasible?
The thesis will, therefore, examine (a) apparent incentives
for an increased reliance on advanced conventional weapons,
(b) possible implications of such weapons, and (c) potential
capabilities and limitations of such weapons.
B. DEFINITIONS
1. Strategic Conflict
The term "strategic conflict" has since 1945, in the
United States and most other Western powers, been synonymous
with nuclear conflict. According to Carl Builder,
For some strategic conflict is defined by its scope: it
means general nuclear war . . . For others, it is defined
by its potential consequences - a war that could destroy
entire societies. Still others associate strategic
conflict with the use of particular weapons - those
carrying nuclear explosives and having intercontinental
range. . . . More helpful here may be Webster's definition
of strategic conflict as warfare designed . . . to strike
3
an enemy at the sources of his military, economic or
political power.'
Thus, Webster's definition of strategic conflict will be used
for the purpose of this thesis.
2. Advanced Conventional Weapon
The term advanced conventional weapon applies to a
complete weapon system based on technologies such as sensors,
munitions, advanced information systems, communication
systems, and missile defense. For the purposes of this
thesis, however, advanced conventional weapon will refer to
extended-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and guided
munitions of great precision, discrimination, and control,
that possess a near-zero circular error probable (CEP)Z and
allow sufficient standoff capability to ensure a high degree
of survivability for the launch platform. "Ideally, standoff
means I can shoot you, but you can't shoot me. At a minimum,
however, standoff should keep my multimillion-dollar airplane
'Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, MA:
Merriam, 1981), 1141, in Carl Builder, The Prospects and
Implications of Non-nuclear Means for Strategic Conflict,
Adelphi Paper -J0 (London: International Institute For
Strategic Studies, 1985), 2. (Emphasis in original)
2Circular Error Probable (CEP) - the radius of the circle
around the intended target within which there is a 50 percent
probability that a weapon aimed at the target would land
within.
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and the pilot in it from getting bagged by a fifty-ruble
gun. "13
The Soviets would have probably equated the term
advanced conventional weapon, as it is used in this thesis,
with the term "high-accuracy weapons. "' High-accuracy weapons
were defined by the Soviets as those:
in which the precision of determination of target
coordinates, the time for reaction of weapons, and the
quality of guidance permits destruction of a target on the
first shot or launch with a probability not less than .6
in real time.'
Another Soviet description included "the principle of 'one
shot (launch)-one hit.''"6
While improved accuracy is required, to fulfill the
definition of advanced conventional weapon, there also must be
sufficient destructive capability in the warhead to ensure a
high probability of kill. This is accomplished through
tEdgar Ulsamer, "Hard Call on Technology." Air Force
Magazine, April 1986, 59, cited in Paul Kozemchak, "New
Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons," in Fred S.
Hoffman, Albert Wohlstetter, and David S. Yost, eds., Swords
and Shields, NATO, The USSR, and New Choices for Long-Range
Offense and Defense (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C.
Heath and Company, 1987), 268.
4Notra Trulock III, Kerry L. Hines,and Anne D. Herr,
Soviet Military Thought in Transition: Implications for the
Long erm Military Competition (Arlington, VA: Pacific-Sierra
Research Corporation, May 1988), 35.
5Lt. General V.G. Reznichenko, Taktika, [Tactics-87]
(Moscow: Voyenizadt, 1987), 23, in, Ibid.
6-olonel Dmitriy Belskiy, under "Observer's
Opinion":"Weapons Trial on Live Testing Ground," Sovetskaya
Rossiya, in Russian 21 March 1991 First Edition, 5, translated
in FBIS Daily Report- Soviet Union, 27 March 1991, 4.
several technologies that already exist, or are on the
foreseeable horizon (e.g., insensitive warheads, fuel air
explosives [FAEs], shaped charges and cassette type warheads
with various submunitions).
C. U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS INITIATIVES OF SEPTEMBER 1991 AND
JANUARY 1992
The question whether advanced conventional weapons can
replace and/or are needed to replace nuclear weapons has been
made more important with the unilateral nuclear reductions
that the United States has announced. If American nuclear
weapons are going Lo be eliminated, how will the United States
accomplish the missions that were assigned to those nuclear
weapons that are being eliminated or withdrawn? Do we need to
replace those weapons?
President Bush announced on 27 September 1991 that he
intended to eliminate all ground-launched tactical nuclear
weapons and to eliminate most tactical nuclear naval weapons.
Furthermore, the President announced his decision to withdraw
and store all nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM-N).
His decision effectively eliminated much of the tactical
nuclear arsenal from the operational inventory. 7 How will the
7See President, Address. "Address to the Nation on
Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," The Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (30 September 1991) vol.
27, no.39, 1348-1351.
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missions previously assigned to tactical nuclear weapons be
accomplished?
If, as many have claimed, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
demonstrated U.S. resolve to support allies with strategic
nuclear forces, will the removal of large numbers of weapons
signify less resolve on the part of the United States? And if
tactical nuclear weapons were needed to deal with deficiencies
in both American military capabilities and those of allies,
what (if anything) can replace those tactical nuclear weapons
that are removed or destroyed) For while tactical nuclear
weapons have been reduced and the immediate threat of attack
by the former Soviet Union has been all but eliminated, the
military requirements that caused the United States to rely so
heavily on tactical nuclear weapons have not been entirely
eliminated. The answer to the military requirements that
tactical nuclear weapons fulfilled may well lie in
technologies that allow many missions previously assigned to
tactical nuclear weapons to be accomplished by advanced
conventional weapons. It is also possible that some missions
assigned to strategic nuclear forces could be performed by
advanced conventional weapons. Reasons to consider such an
option include the possibility of future nuclear weapons
scarcity caused both by unilateral arms reductions, arms
control agreements, and by technical difficulties currently
faced with the production of critical components of nuclear
weapons.
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In his State of the Union address of January 1992 President
Bush announced that:
After completing 20 planes for which we have begun
procurement, we will shut down further production of the
B-2 bomber. We will cancel the small ICBM program. We will
cease production of new warheads for our sea-based
ballistic missiles. We will stop all new production of the
Peacekeeper missile. And we will not purchase any more
advanced cruise missiles. 8
He also announced that he had informed President Yeltsin of
the Russian Federation that if the Commonwealth of Independent
States would eliminate all its land-based multiple-warhead
missiles, the United States would do the following:
We would eliminate all Peacekeeper [MX] missiles. We
would reduce the number of warheads on Minuteman missiles
to one, and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based
missiles by one-third."
With the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons that the
July 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) calls for
and the possible further reductions that any follow-on to
START"0 would call for, along with unilateral nuclear arms
reductions already proposed, it is possible that there would
not be enough warheads to cover all the targets currently in
the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) . Changes in the
8
"The State of the Union: Text of President Bush's
Address," Washington Post, 29 January 1992, A14.
91bid.
"1°It was agreed prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union
that after START was signed the United States and the Soviet
Union would quickly begin negotiations on further cuts in
strategic nuclear weapons. A popular goal for "Follow-On to
START" is 2000-3000 nominal warhead allowances.
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SIOP have reportedly already been implemented to deal with the
changed international situation (specifically, the breakup of
the Warsaw Pact), eliminating "roughly 3,000 potential
targets," and providing "for using fewer warheads in various
attack options. ""
Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
possibility of further changes to the SIOP, it is conceivable
that the United States may find itself unable to hold at risk
all of the targets that are considered important because of
nuclear weapons scarcities. President Bush's offer to cease
production of many new nuclear weapons may have been
influenced by current difficulties faced in producing nuclear
weapons.
The current shutdown of key nuclear weapons components
production sites has postponed and put into doubt the further
production of new nuclear warheads. As an example, it appears
that the shutdown of the Rocky Flats facility has postponed
indefinitely the equipping of all Trident SSBNs with D-5
missiles. One article reports that:
The U.S. Navy cannot arm fully all of the Trident D5
ballistic missiles equipping three of the new Ohio (SSBN-
726) class SSBNs because of a shortage of nuclear
warheads. . . . The shutdown was forced by a prolonged
shutdown of the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons [plant] near
Denver, Co. The shutdown of the Rocky Flats plant is the
first known case of a substantial change in U.S. strategic
plans forced by industrial problems. . . . it is the only
plant making the plutonium 'pits' which form the core of
"•R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Trims off Targets in Soviet
Union," Washington Post, 21 July 1991, Al.
9
all nuclear warheads. The Government hopes to re-open the
plant later this year [1991] but. . . the restart date
remains in doubt.,
Targets are of course prioritized, but should the planners
at the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) drop
targets if they don't have enough warheads, or should they
consider alternative weapons to strike targets that would
otherwise be left unattacked?
The thesis will argue that there are non-nuclear weapons
that could effectively attack specific targets in the evolving
SIOP, thus allowing planners greater latitude in their
allocation of shrinking nuclear weapons assets. Additionally,
potential threats from regions other than the former Soviet
Union will demand increasing attention. The United States
will have to determine whether it might respond to such
threats with nuclear weapons or, as this thesis will argue,
with advanced conventional weapons.
D. SUMMARY
Current changes in the world military and political
situation and the coincident revolution offered by
conventional weapons technologies have made a greater reliance
on advanced conventional weapons practical and imperative.
Numerous incentives exist for the substitution of advanced
conventional weapons for many of the missions assigned to
"
12U.S. Trident SSBNs Not Fully Armed," Naval Forces, Vol.
XII, No. IV, (1991), 6.
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nuclear weapons. Current technologies allow for the production
of highly accurate and relatively inexpensive extended-range
weapons. Precise delivery systems and more effective
conventional warhead technology make possible the substitution
of advanced conventional weapons for missions previously
assigned, mainly, or exclusively to nuclear weapons.
The following chapters examine incentives for the United
States to pursue such substitutions, along with possible
implications of a greater reliance on advanced conventional
weapons capabilities. The "delegitimization" of nuclear
deterrence is examined, as well as environmental concerns over
the use and production of nuclear weapons. It will be argued
that the "delegitimization" of nuclear deterrence and various
concerns about nuclear weapons have combined to make the
threat of nuclear weapons employment by the United States less
credible. Considerations that make nuclear deterrence less
credible may, however, make advanced conventional weapons
capabilities more credible.
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II. THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
The United States has a number of reasons to pursue
further research and development of advanced conventional
weapons to replace nuclear weapons. One of the most important
reasons may well be the "lapse of faith,`- in nuclear
deterrence, or the "delegitimization of nuclear deterrence"1 4
that reached its zenith in the early 1980s in the United
States.
This chapter attempts to identify causes of the
delegitimization phenomenon. It appears that the ability of
the United States to use its nuclear forces to deter its
adversaries has declined due to many of the same factors that
helped cause the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence. The
chapter will argue that advances in conventional weapons
technologies mean that the "delegitimization of nuclear
deterrence" will only continue to grow in scope. In a nurrLer
of instances, particularly regional conflicts, conventional
deterrence capabilities now offer more credible policy
alternatives than nuclear employment threats.
"
13Robert Tucker, The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the
Lapse of Faith (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), 61-89.
"
14David S. Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear
Deterrence?," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 16 No. 4, (Summer
1990), 487-508.
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A. THE DECLINE IN CONFIDENCE AND U.S. DETERRENCE THEORY
Although there have been periods of anxiety over nuclear
weapons and their possible wartime use since 1945, such as
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for the most part
Americans quietly accepted the necessity for nuclear weapons
and their possible use. The American public's resignation to
nuclear weapons, however, seemed to change during the 1980s.
The anti-nuclear movement achieved unprecedented status during
the first Reagan administration. Robert Tucker notes:
In the 1980s, people did more to express their anxiety
over nuclear weapons. Not only did they sign petitions
and give money, many of them took (however decorously) to
the streets. . . . Moreover, once the nuclear issue had
suddenly resurfaced-whether in the form of the freeze or
on a more general manner-it became politicized in a way
that it never really did in the 1950s and early 1960s.7ý
The early 1980s clearly were marked by a certain decline
in confidence in nuclear deterrence, or as David Yost states
". . a tendency towards a 'delegitimization' of nuclear
deterrence . . . emerged in some important sectors of the
elite and attentive publics in countries such as Britain, West
Germany, and the United States.''i To understand why this
"•Tucker, The Nuclear Debate, 4.
"•"This 'delegitimization' might be defined as (at least
in some circles) reduced confidence in the reliability and
safety of nuclear deterrence arrangements and lessened
certainty about the practical prudence, strategic necessity,
and/or moral legitimacy of posing nuclear threats to
adversaries." Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear
Deterrence?," 487.
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delegitimization occurred one must examine the evolution of
Western nuclear deterrence theory and why changes occurred.
The idea of deterrence is not new. Since man first walked
on this earth the idea of preventing someone from doing
something through the threat of force has existed. Glenn
Snyder wrote that "deterrence means discouraging the enemy
from taking military action by posing him a prospect of cost
and risk outweighing his prospective gain."'e 7
The United States has always had to concern itself with a
number of potential and actual adversaries. During the Cold
War, however, American discussions of deterrence theory were
confined almost exclusively to deterring the Soviet Union from
(a) initiating hostilities or (b) coercing the United States
and its allies. In the early years of the Cold War Americans
were concerned with preventing the Soviets from overrunning
the European continent. According to Albert Wohlstetter,
The U.S. strategic force was intended from the outset to
deter or defend against a Soviet invasion of Western
Europe. It was intended to compensate for the Soviet
advantage in the theater and the instability that that
advantage could mean."•
17Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a theory
of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), 3, cited in R.B. Byers ed., Deterrence in the 1980s:
Crisis and Dilemma (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 11.
"
8Albert Wohlstetter, "The Political and Military Aims of
Offense and Defense Innovation," in, Hoffman, Wohlstetter and
Yost eds., Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices
for Long-Range Offense and Defense, 30.
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After 1949, with the first explosion of a Soviet A-bomb,
deterrence strategists were also concerned with deterring
Soviet nuclear strikes on U.S. territory. Popular American
concerns over potential Soviet nuclear attacks on U.S.
territory were heightened with the launch of the first man-
made satellite, Sputnik I, on 4 October 1957, and the
subsequent belief in a missile gap between the Soviet Union
and the United States. 9
Approaches to deterrence can be grouped into two
categories: "deterrence by punishment" or "deterrence by
denial." According to some U.S. analysts, deterrence by
denial is associated with defenses that convince the opponent
that he will not meet his objectives. Deterrence by
punishment, on the other hand, is based on the threat to
inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in response to his
aggression.," The former relies on some sort of military
'
9There were a number of Western analysts who had foreseen
a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and concerned themselves with
deterring Soviet nuclear actions prior to the Soviet explosion
of a nuclear device. With the successful testing, however,
the problem became a much more immediate threat to be
contemplated by Western analysts and decision-makers.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson considered questions of
deterring Soviet nuclear actions in his 1949 memorandum. See
"Memorandum by the Secretary of State," 20 December 1949, in
Fnreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. 1: Atomic
Energy (Washingtorn D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976), 612-17.
"'
0Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a theory
of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), 14-16, cited in George H. Quester, The Future of
Nuclear Deterrence (Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books/D.C.
Heath and Company, 1986), 18.
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means to stop the enemy from meeting his objective, while the
later threatens the enemy with ruinous damage to his homeland
in response to his aggression.
Although many argue that from the beginning of the nuclear
age the United States has relied on "deterrence by
punishment," there were times when "deterrence by denial" was
possible." Military planners did not intend to use nuclear
weapons to punish the enemy; rather they hoped to deny the
enemy the means to achieve military objectives. Aaron
Friedberg writes of the "City-Busting" strategy of the period,
1945-1950:
Essentially, American military planners were looking for
ways to defeat superior ground forces as quickly as
possible. The best way seemed to be to hit at those
cities containing the heart of the Russian war machine. 2:
Nevertheless, for many Westerners it did not matter whether
the United States relied on "deterrence by denial" or
"deterrence by punishment." The perceived effects of nuclear
"
1Robert Jervis argues that relying on counterforce
strategies does not constitute "deterrence by denial." (See
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution [Ithaca,
Ny.: Cornell University Press, 1989], 11.) However, one must
examine the reason behind such targeting. If American
military planners selected counterforce/"damage-limiting"
targeting in order to reduce the damage that the Soviets would
be able to inflict, thereby denying the Soviets the military
goals they had intended for their strategic nuclear forces,
then it seems as some form of "deterrence by denial" was
taking place.
"
2Aaron Friedberg, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic
'Doctrine' - 1945-1981," in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., The
Strategic Imperative, New Policies for American Security
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1982), 65.
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weapons use - millions of innocent deaths - remained
relatively the same.
While the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly,
deterrence by denial was possible since America's nuclear
weapons could be used to thwart a Soviet attack with little
fear of retaliation. Even after the Soviet Union acquired its
own nuclear weapons, deterrence by denial was possible because
U.S. nuclear superiority in weapons stockpiles and weapons
delivery means was so great that the United States was capable
of launching preemptive strikes against the Soviet Union that
might have destroyed a majority, if not all, of its nuclear
weapons. Even during the time of the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis the United States, arguably, had the ability to
conduct "damage-limitation" strikes and to retain significant
residual nuclear forces to threaten any surviving Soviet
nuclear forces. But while deterrence by denial was
theoretically possible, the perception (and the reality) was
still one of having to threaten millions of civilian lives.
In effect elite and public recognition of basic realities
about potential large-scale nuclear weapons employment kept
the United States from capitalizing on its nuclear
superiority. According to McGeorge Bundy,
We did assert that we had strategic superiority, and we
did assert that having it made a difference. What we did
not say so loudly was that the principal use of this
numerical superiority was in its value as reassurance to
17
the American public and as a means of warding off demands
for still larger forces. 23
It was clear to President Kennedy that a "general nuclear
exchange, even at the levels of 1961, would be so great a
disaster as to be an unexampled failure of statesmanship. ,24
Robert Jervis summarizes the evolution of American nuclear
thought by writing:
In the early years of the Cold War, Americans felt quite
secure even though the United States did not possess the
ability for what would later be called "assured
destruction." Indeed in the early 1950s, enthusiasm for
a counterforce strategy waned when the analysts at the
Rand Corporation found that such a attack would kill up to
two million Soviet civilians. In the same way, in 1961
analysts calculated that Soviet retaliation in the event
of an American first strike would kill between two and
three million Americans in the best case and ten to
fifteen million in the worst case. This estimate was more
than sufficient to deter the United States from launching
such a strike, even during the provocation of the Cuban
Missile Crisis."2
By the late-1960s to early-1970s2 almost no one doubted
that American nuclear superiority had given way to strategic
parity. Many civilian American analysts had, by then, been
convinced that "deterrence by punishment" was the only
23McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years
Later: What Has Changed?," in The Future of Strategic
Deterrence: Part I, Adelphi Papers 160 (London: The




'Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 219.
"
25This is the period usually considered to mark the
transition from American nuclear superiority to strategic
parity. By the early 1970s most analysts agreed that a
practical strategic parity existed between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
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deterrent option available to the United States and the Soviet
Union because of the secure second-strike capabilities that
both governments possessed and the coincident belief by many
American analysts that nuclear war would mean "Armageddon or
nothing. ,,7
While assured destruction strategies, which are consistent
with "deterrence by punishment," had long played a part in
American deterrence theory, with the advent of secure second-
strike capabilities on both sides, Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD) became the predominant deterrence strategy among a
number of American analysts by the mid-1960s. According to
Albert Wohlstetter,
In the mid-1960s the views of this faction [supporters
of MAD] . . . came to have a more than academic influence.
Their views became the declaratory policy of the U.S.
government and in fact inspired the efforts of some of the
principal negotiators on the U.S. side at the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) talks and the
attempts they made to relate offense and defense in the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the SALT I
agreement on offensive forces.-•
Others, like Robert Jervis, however, argue that MAD is not a
strategy but a fact.-` According to Jervis,
Mutual second-strike capability has drastically altered
the ways in which states can use force to reach their
'-An Aspen Strategy Group Report, Deep Cuts and the Future
of Nuclear Deterrence (Lanham, MD: The Aspen Institute, 1989),
7.
-"Woh1stetter, "The Political and Military Aims of Offense
and Defense Innovation," 7-8.
-'Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chapter
3 "MAD Is a Fact, Not a Policy."
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goals. In the past, successful armies could
simultaneously seize desired territory, punish the other
side, limit or diminish the effectiveness of the other
side's arms, and, most important in this context, keep the
adversary from doing these things to the state.
Defense now being impossible, the superpowers deter their
adversaries not by threatening to defeat them, but by
raising the threat of conflict to unacceptably high levels
. It is the prospect of fighting the war rather than
the possibility of losing it that induces restraint.3°
The fact that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) became
synonymous to many Western analysts and most of the informed
general public with the situation the United States and the
Soviet Union faced, 3' probably played a significant role in
causing or exacerbating the "delegitimization of nuclear
deterrence." In all likelihood the belief that a nuclear war
with the Soviet Union would result in Mutual Assured
Destruction caused many American, to rethink the military
usefulness of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the fears raised
by the bellicose language ot ch>- ear'y Reagan administration
heightened the belief that war with the USSR was probable.
According to Robert Tucker,
The lapse of faith in deterrence has been laid largely at
the doorstep of the Reagan administration. A legion of
critics insisted that this administration must bear a
major responsibility for a movement and debate that might
"
3rIbid., 8.
31It must be noted that a number of Western experts on
Soviet military affairs have judged that the Soviets did not
agree that MAD was a fact, nor was it a policy of the Soviet
Union. Evidence for such a position included Soviet
literature and equipment that emphasized surviving and winning
a nuclear war. For example, Harriet Fast and William F.
Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Third Edition (Boulder,
Co.: Westview Press, 1984). (See especially 402-404.)
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have been avoided by a government with a less ideological
and less bellicose outlook."
B. THE CREDIBILITY GAP
If nuclear war with the Soviet Union ultimately meant
destruction of both the United States and the Soviet Union, it
seemed incredible to many for the United States to threaten
its own destruction. As Jervis writes, "[b]ecause the use of
strategic nuclear weapons would entail national suicide, there
is no rational way for either side to threaten or use them
against the other.1"33 (Jervis assumes that limited nuclear
use options articulated by U.S. officials at various times -
e.g., McNamara in 1962 and Schlesinger in 1974 - would lead to
uncontrolled nuclear escalation.) R.B. Byers writes that "in
the nuclear age the primary (only?) utility of nuclear weapons
is to deter attack. . . . The dilemma has been apparent since
the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima: how to make credible
the incredible."'34  Kissinger may have put it best when he
said, "[iIt is not possible indefinitely to tell democratic
publics that their security depends on the mass extermination
of civilians, unopposed by either defenses or a mitigating
"
3Tucker, The Nuclear Debate, 66-67.
"
33Jervis, The Meaning of The Nuclear Revolution, 76,
emphasis added.
34Byers, Deterrence in the 1980s, 16, emphasis in the
original.
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strategy, without sooner or later producing pacifism and
unilateral disarmament."'5
More factors than just the fear of national suicide have
been at work in creating a credibility gap. Among these
factors the American way of war and associated perceptions of
proper moral conduct of war have had much to do with the
growing lack of confidence in the military utility of nuclear
weapons.
1. The American Way of War
To understand the moral dilemma that Americans face
with respect to nuclear weapons, one must first understand the
American way of war. The American way of war has a number of
important characteristics that bear upon the potential use of
nuclear weapons in war.
The first characteristic of the American way of war is
that it attempts to minimize the number of American military
casualties. A.J. Bacevich writes of the experience of Korea,
"they [the American public] wanted to achieve that end
[containing communism] by capitalizing on American strengths,
particularly technology, rather than by squandering American
manpower.1' 36 Similarly, General Weyand wrote of the American
"
3SHenry Kissinger, "After Reykjavik: Current East-West
Negotiations," The San Francisco Meeting of the Trilateral
Commission, March 1987, 4, cited in Jervis, The Meaning of
the Nuclear Revolution, 213.
3
'A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era (Washington D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1986), 10.
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way of war as follows: "[t]he American way of war is
particularly violent, deadly and dreadful. We believe in
using 'things'- artillery, bombs, massive firepower - in order
to conserve our soldiers' lives.'"37
Nuclear weapons, early in the nuclear era, were held
out as the prime examples of weapons that ..ould enable the
U.S. to minimize its own battlefield casualties through the
use of technology. It is interesting to note that the only
wartime use of nuclear weapons has been justified by the
judgement that it saved thousands, if not millions, of
American lives. President Truman wrote in 1960 that "[t]he
dropping of the bombs stcvped the war, saved millions of
lives. ",3
The traditional American tendency to substitute
weapons for manpower helped to lead to the U.S. and NATO
declared policy to use nuclear weapons if faced with defeat in
the context of a Soviet invasion of Europe. Nuclear weapons
offered the chance to reduce the manpower requirements for the
American armed forces and, until the Soviet Union obtained
nuclear weapons, offered the possibility of lower American and
allied casualties sustained in combat. The use of nuclear
" 'Gcneral Fred C. Weyand, "Vietnam Myths and American
Realities," CDRS Calls, (July-August 1976), 3-4, cited in
Harry Summers, Jr., On Strategy (New York: Dell Publishing,
1984), 69.
"
38Harry Truman, Truman Speaks (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1960), 67.
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weapons against any populated areas would, however, as with
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, exact an unacceptable
toll on innocent civilians in the eyes of many Americans.
Thus, after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons,
many Americans believed that not only would innocent civilians
of the enemy be killed or injured, but that any use of nuclear
weapons would invite a nuclear response that would also kill
millions of Americans. The hope of saving American lives had
been behind the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945. After
the Soviets gained nuclear weapons, however, it appeared that
the use of nuclear weapons against the USSR would likely
invite unacceptable American casualties.
Even more important to the rising fears of many was
the belief that nuclear war was inevitable. In 1985, Robert
Tucker wrote, "[t]he view that nuclear war has become ever
more likely, and that if we continue along our present course
we will transform a possibility into a probability, is given
frequent expression."'32 Thus the fear of nuclear war and its
perceived consequences played large roles in creating a lack
of confidence in nuclear deterrence policies. Moreover, the
moral questions implicit in relying on nuclear deterrence had
much to do with the decline in confidence.
"
3ýTucker, The Nuclear Debate, 9.
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2. The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
For many Americans war is something that should be
aimed solely against an enemy's military. "Our political and
moral thought is predicated on limits. Nuclear weapons
challenge this assumption by the virtue of their
destructiveness and, of course, their rate of destruction."i4
U.S. political and military leaders have traditionally made
their limited aims clear. U.S. leaders often declare that
they seek to defeat the enemy's military, while professing the
hope of minimizing the loss to civilians. McClellan said upon
his drive into Virginia, "I have not come here to wage war
upon the defenseless, upon non-combatants, upon private
property, nor upon the domestic institutions of the land."14
More recently, President Bush stated, upon initiating the
drive to liberate Kuwait, that his problem was not with the
Iraqi people, but rather with Saddam Hussein and his military.
Some examples, however, show a different tendency -
like Sherman's march through Georgia and LeMay's campaign of
fire raids against Japan. According to John Frederick Fuller,
when Sherman set out on his famous march through Georgia,
he made this new concept of war his guiding principle, and
waged war against the people of the South as fully as
against its armed forces. . . . Terror was the basic
factor in Sherman's policy, he openly says so. . . . "We
are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile
40Ibid., 11.
"
41Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 134.
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people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel
the hard hand of war.",42
LeMay's bombing campaign against Japan was also directed
against the Japanese people themselves. According to Mark
Clodfelter,
These attacks [prior to the fire raids], designed to
support the planned invasion of Japan, produced little
damage because of the dispersal of the Japanese aircraft
industry . . . As a result, LeMay searched for a new
method to conduct strategic bombing. . . . Japanese cities
also contained a large number of highly inflammable wooden
structures, and much of the American public sought maximum
retribution for Pearl Harbor. These combined factors led
LeMay to initiate the firebombing of Japan . ... LeMay's
incendiary assault and the atomic raids that followed
revealed a new emphasis in the strategic campaign against
Japan: the direct destruction of the enemy's will to
resist.43
Americans, nevertheless, believe that they maintain the
highest moral standards in the conduct of war. As one author
wrote, "Soviet Communism did little to affect her [America's]
sense of moral and political superiority. Such superiority,
after all, was natural because democracy was by definition
pacific. "'
Many factors have been involved in the
delegitimization of nuclear deterrence. But "[i]t [the
41The War of the Rebellion, Vol.LXXIX, 162, cited in
Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War (Minerva
Press, 1968), 108-109.
4 3Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: The
Free Press, 1989), 7.
"44Curt Gasteyger, "The Determinants of Change: Deterrence
and the Political Environment," a chapter in The Future of
Strategic Deterrence: Part II, Adelphi Papers 161 (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), 3.
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delegitimization] must also be attributed to the conviction
that deterrence represents a fall from grace and that it
constitutes a kind of moral purgatory, a state of near sin
from which we should do our utmost to escape.'' 45 While not
declaring nuclear deterrence to be a fall from grace, the U.S.
National Conference of Catholic Bishops did have a part in the
delegitimization of nuclear deterrence. "The Catholic and
United Presbyterian churches have raised serious questions
about the morality of deterrence, and U.S. nuclear deterrence
policy in particular.''4t
a. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops
In May 1983 the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops agreed to a position on nuclear deterrence," and in
June 198841 they reiterated this position. While the Bishops
agreed that the maintenance of nuclear weapons for the sake of
deterrence was justified, they came to quite a different
opinion on the actual use of nuclear weapons. The Bishops
said of nuclear war:
"
4ETucker, The Nuclear Debate, 17.
"•Keith Payne and Jill Coleman, "Christian Nuclear
Pacifism and Just War Theory: Are They Compatible?"
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 7, 1988, 75.
47The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The
Challenge of Peace: A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, 3 May
1983.
4
"The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Building
Peace, A Report on The Challenge of Peace and Policy
Developments 1983-1988, June 1988.
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Nuclear war remains a possibility, but it is increasingly
seen as devoid of the rational political purpose and moral
limits which have made war a justifiable activity in the
past. Nuclear weapons threaten to destroy the very
objectives which have provided the political and moral
justification for using force . . . . The uniqueness
(posed by nuclear weapons) arises from the scope and
degree of devastation these weapons can wreak. 4 '
The Bishops make clear that they would oppose any
nuclear attacks near population centers, even in retaliation
to Soviet countercity strikes. The following illustrates the
point:
Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other
instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of
destroying population centers or other predominantly
civilian targets . . . the principle holds even if our
cities have been struck by the adversary."
There are, of course, many other religious and political
groups that hold similar positions on nuclear deterrence.
There were also many critics of the Bishops' report. While
disagreeing with the Bishops on many of their positions, even
critics of the Bishops' report acknowledged the moral dilemmas





b. Critics of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops' Report
Sir Michael Quinlan notes that "[t]hose who believe
that the use of nuclear weapons" might in some extreme
circumstance be justifiable face two main difficulties
the first dilficulty is how any final strategic blow heavy
enough for its prospect to underpin deterrence could avoid
being too indiscriminate and disproportionate to be morally
tolerable. The second concerns risk that any use of nuclear
weapons might start an uncontrollable process leading to an
intolerable outcome."52 Albert Wohlstetter states that,
"[iInformed realists in foreign-policy establishments as well
as pacifists should oppose aiming to kill bystanders with
nuclear or conventional weapons: indiscriminate Western
threats paralyze the West, not the East."113 How does this
apparent unanimity of opinion against the destruction of
innocents complement the American way of war?
'lSir Michael is not concerned "with narrowly-specific
uses like ballistic-missile interception and antisubmarine
warfare, or single-shot 'no target' demonstrations.
Deterrence cannot be built on these alone." See Sir Michael
Quinlan, "The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence: A Critical Comment
on the Pastoral Letter of the U.S. Catholic Bishops,"
Theological Studies, (Quinlan footnote 6) Vol. 48 (1987), 8.
"o'Ibid., 8.
SAlbert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesman, and Other
Strategists On the Bombing of Innocents," Commentary, vol. 75,
June 1983, 15.
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c. The Moral Dilemma and the American Way of War
It is readily apparent that an intimate connection
between the American way of war and the moral prohibitions of
the Catholic Bishops exists. The inhibitions about
threatening to attack military targets near population centers
with nuclear weapons hinge on the general (and presumably
well-founded) presumption that a nuclear attack near
population centers would inevitably lead to large numbers of
innocents being killed. The widespread judgement that the use
of nuclear weapons against targets in populated regions would
cause indiscriminatc% damage has had obvious effects on the
willingness o" 1' S. administrations to use any nuclear options
during armed conflicts of recent history. Because of the
Americen way of war, much of the serious debate over nuclear
weapons has been confined to the subject of deterrence.
According to Colin Gray,
the United States has been unable, to date, to come to
grips with the prospect of viewing, and planning for
nuclear war as war. American, and more generally, Western
democratic values are deemed to be so incompatible with
the actual conduct and consequences of nuclear war that
the vast bulk of U.S. nuclear-age strategic thinking has
been confined to the problems of prewar deterrence.
The predicted effects of any wartime use of nuclear
weapons contrast sharply with the American way of war. These
effects have, therefore, along with the increases in potential
54Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style
(Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986), 40.
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capability available in advanced conventional weapons,
encouraged the development and production of advanced
conventional weapons to substitute for nuclear munitions. As
Albert Wohlstetter puts it, "we have urgent political and
military as well as moral grounds for improving our ability to
answer an attack on Western military forces with less
unintended killing, not to mention deliberate mass
slaughter.""5 The moral and practical arguments, in effect,
call for the replacement of weapons of relative disutility
with weapons of greater utility. Utility is here defined by
decreased collateral damage.
Moreover, with the changes that have occurred in
recent years it can be argued that the major remaining value
of nuclear weapons (namely for the deterrence of nuclear
aggression or coercion by the Soviet Union) has decreased in
urgency. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union at the
end of 1991, it was clear that, as Leon Sloss observed, "the
Soviet threat has changed signiticantly. Today aggression by
the Soviet Union is highly unlikely."E• Today, with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat has diminished
further. Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, USAF, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and Robert M. Gates, Director of
"SWohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesman, and Other Strategists
On the Bombing of Innocents," 15.
""•Leon Sloss, "U.S. Strategic Forces After the Cold War:
Policies and Strategies," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn
1991, 145.
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the Central Intelligence Agency, recently testified before
Congress on the threat from the former Soviet Union. General
Clapper said, "I see virtually no likelihood of premeditated
Russian or commonwealth military aggression against the U.S.
and its allies. The intentions of the new commonwealth states
toward the West have clearly changed, and overall, the
military successor states are in profound decline. ,s7
Director Gates added, "The threat to the United States of
deliberate attack from that quarter has all but disappeared
for the foreseeable future."'
Increasingly the United States will find itself
facing nuclear and non-nuclear "emerging powers" as
adversaries. Advanced conventional weapons could play a
significant role against such potential adversaries. A recent
military panel came to similar conclusions. According to the
Reed Report, as it is popularly referred to,
American armed forces have engaged in combat in the Third
World on a number of occasions during the nuclear age.
Most recently, in the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition
faced an Iraqi army which on the eve of Desert Storm was
assessed to be second only to Israel on the Middle East
in terms of military capability. . . . resulting in one of
the most lopsided victories in history. It also ushered
1 7General Clapper cited in Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Chief




in a new age of technological warfare which suggests some
of the potential for non-nuclear strategic weapons.
The ability of the United States, however, to credibly
threaten nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear powers is
highly doubtful. The credibility of threatening non-nuclear
powers has diminished both because of domestic political
pressures and because of the fact that overt nuclear threats
have not been made against a non-nuclear adversary since the
United States threatened China with nuclear weapons use during
the Korean War and regarding the Formosa Straits in the late
1950s.
C. NUCLEAR COERCION
Some argue that the United States was able to use its
nuclear superiority to coerce the Soviets on a number of
occasions. Specific exanrples of U.S. use of nuclear threats
to coerce the Soviets have been advanced.
President Eisenhower, for example, used nuclear threats
against the Soviets during the 1959 Berlin Crisis. When
questioned by a reporter if the United States was ready "to
use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend free Berlin,"
President Eisenhower replied, "Well, I don't know how you
1.4Thomas C. Reed and Michael 0. Wheeler, The Role of
Nuclear Weapons in The New World Order, (mimeo, January 1992),
12. Thomas Reed was Secretary of the Air Force from 1976 to
1977. He was also the chairman of the panel that investigated
the role of nuclear weapons in the new world order. The
resulting report, therefore, is often referred to as the "Reed
Report."
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could free anything with nuclear weapons." He went on to say,
however, that the United States was prepared to meet its
"responsibilities with respect to Berlin., t ' And in his
memoirs he wrote,
While giving Khrushchev every opportunity to be
sensible, we were determined that he should have no reason
to question our readiness and capacity to defend our
rights. "In this gamble," I said, "we are not going to be
betting white chips, building up the pot gradually and
fearfully. Khrushchev should know that when we decide to
act, our whole stack will be in the pot.""6
President Kennedy also used nuclear threats against the
Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. Many feared
that the Kennedy administration had taken the United States to
the brink of nuclear war with the Soviets in order to force
the Soviet Union to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba.
Others, however, would argue that President Kennedy used the
offer of withdrawing nuclear missiles from Turkey, in order to
obtain the concession he desired from the Soviets.-' It
seems clear, though, that nuclear coercion or compellence was,
at least, in part used to achieve the desired results.
"
6U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington D.C. :Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Record Service, 1959), Dwight D,
Eisenhower, 1958, 245.
6
'Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 338-39.
6 2Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989).
While Garthoff does not make the argument that only Kennedy's
concessions contributed to the Soviet withdrawal of nuclear
missiles from Cuba, the impression is that the concessions
were a major factor.
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A more recent example of nuclear coercion came during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Nixon Administration put the
nuclear forces on alert in response to a Soviet threat to
intervene on the behalf of the Egyptians. The use of the
American nuclear threat apparently kept the Soviets from
carrying out their threat. 62
While nuclear weapons were successful in constraining
Soviet responses in many areas of the globe, some question the
continuing utility of nuclear coercion against Russia and the
other successor states of the former Soviet Union. Some
Soviet statements imply that American nuclear threats early in
the Cold War coerced the Soviets from completing many moves
they had begun. As their nuclear stockpile grew, however,
they believed that the United States could no longer coerce
them. According to David Yost,
The Soviets in the late 1960s and early 1970s attributed
key changes in U.S. and NATO strategy to the growth of
Soviet nuclear forces, which deprived previous U.S.
nuclear threats of credibility. In 1970 General
Lieutenant I.G. Zav'yalcv wrote as follows: "The successes
achieved in the Soviet Union in the [nuclear] sphere had
a sobering effect on the reactionary circles of
imperialist states, became the restraining factor in the
path of their aggressive aspirations, and compelled them
to change their strategic concepts. As a result, the
'strategy of flexible response' emerged first in the
"
63Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, "The Political Utility
of Nuclear Weapons," in Steven Miller, ed., Strategy and
Nuclear Deterrence, An International Security Reader
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 272-297.
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United States, and later was also adopted by the
aggressive NATO Bloc.",64
Early periods of the Cold War offer examples of the United
States using nuclear threats to coerce a non-Soviet opponent.
While not all threats were explicit, there were at least
implicit threats of nuclear response during a number of
crises.
President Eisenhower used both implicit and explicit
threats. During the Korean War President Eisenhower let the
North Koreans and Chinese know that he would use nuclear
weapons if they did not return to the negotiating table and
make significant progress on American proposals. "In late May
[1953] Secretary of State John Foster Dulles communicated this
message to India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for relay
to China. Eisenhower also sent this message to Peking through
Chinese officials at Panmunjom."'6
64General Lieutenant I.G. Zav'yalov, "the New Weapon and
Military Art," Red Star, October 30, 1970, in Selected Soviet
Military Writings, 1970-1975, translated and published under
the auspices of the U.S. Air Force (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977), 207, cited in David S.
Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western
Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 159-
160.
"
6SEdward C. Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History 10 (Summer
1986): 280. "In 1965, Eisenhower told Army General Andrew
Goodpaster that 'he had passed word secretly to the Chinese
at the time of Korea that if they failed to stop the war they
were liable to direct attack by us, including nuclear weapon
attack.' See 'Meeting with General Eisenhower, 12 May 1965,'
memorandum, Goodpaster to President Johnson, National
Security Files, Name File: President Eisenhower, Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, Box 3. Cited in Mark
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During the crisis over the Chinese offshore islands of
Quemoy and Matsu, Eisenhower relied on nuclear threats to
deter the Chinese mainland government from going to war in the
Formosa Straits. When asked to comment on Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles' comment that the administration was
prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons in case of Chinese
aggression, Eisenhower replied:
Now, in any combat where these things [tactical atomic
weapons] can be used on strictly military targets and for
strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they
shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a
bullet."
He wrote in his memoirs that he "hoped this answer would have
some effect in persuading the Chinese Communists of the
strength of our determination.", 7
D. ABSENCE OF U.S. ATTEMPTS OF COERCION
U.S. experiences in attempting to use nuclear coercion
against non-nuclear nations, however, have shown a definite
history of declining utility. Much of the reason for the
declining ability to credibly coerce non-nuclear nations has
Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, endnote 52, 14.
"66U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington D.C. :Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Record Service, 1955), Dwight D,
Eisenhower, 1955, 332 cited in Robert A. Devine, Eisenhower
and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981),
62.
6"Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 477.
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to do with the American way of war and the self-restraint that
comes from it. The Reed report referred to Secretary of State
Vance's 1978 pledge "that the U.S. would not use nuclear
weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or to any comparable
internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear
explosive devices.''lt The report concluded,
In cases of clear aggression which threaten fundamental
U.S. interests, especially where weapons of mass
destruction or other highly lethal weapons are involved,
the United States should retain an option to leave
ambiguous whether it would employ nuclear weapons in
retaliation to gross acts on the part of the aggressor."
During the French involvement in Indochina, at the battle
of Dien Bien Phu, some U.S. military leaders reportedly
t
'On 12 June 1978, Secretary of State Vance said that "the
President has decided to elaborate the U.S. position on the
question of security assurances. His objective is to encourage
support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to increase
international security and stability, and to create a more
positive environment for success of the Special Session. To
this end, the President declares: 'The United States will not
use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state
party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding
commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in
the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or
armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a
nuclear weapons state, or associated with a nuclear weapons
state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.'" Cyrus Vance
statement to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, cited in
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agreements: Text and Histories of
Negotiations ([Washington D.C.] U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1982), 87.
"•Reed and Wheeler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the
New World Order, 18-19.
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indicated a willingness to contemplate the use of nuclear
weapons against the Vietminh. According to Stanley Karnow,
The idea tantalized Radford [Adm. Radford was then the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and he favored its
proposal to the French. But the notion alarmed senior
State Department officials, one of whom warned that, if
the French were approached, "the story would certainly
leak" and spark "a great hue and cry throughout the
parliaments of the free world., 7,
It is noteworthy that the United States did not use nuclear
threats against the Vietminh or the North Vietnamese.
Although the u3e of nuclear weapons to help the French at the
Battle of Dien Bien Phu reportedly was considered by some U.S.
officials, this idea was quickly dismissed. According to
Stephen Ambrose,
Within the U.S. military, discussion favored the use of
low yield nuclear weapons. Eisenhower. . . when these
discussions were reported to him. . . responded "You boys
must be crazy. We can't use those awful things against
Asians for a second time in less than ten years. My
God.
The reasons for not relying on nuclear threats or
employment against the Vietminh were numerous. Along with the
fear of the international community's response to the use of
nuclear weapons was the judgement "that this would still have
involved committing large numbers of ground forces to Indo-
7
uStanley Karnow, Vietnam - A History (New York: The
Viking Press, 1983), 197.
"
7 1Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1983), vol. 2, 184, cited in Carl Kaysen, Robert
McNamara, and George Rathjens, Nuclear Weapons After the Cold
War," Foreign Affairs, 100.
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China."',7 Clearly, however, anticipated domestic and
international responses to nuclear threats played a role in
restraining the United States government from using nuclear
threats.
After the French had abandoned Vietnam, and the Americans
had committed themselves to the defense of South Vietnam, the
Americans continued to refrain from making nuclear threats
against the North Vietnamese. Most American policy planners
of the time believed that the Vietcong were communist
insurgents from North Vietnam, supported by China and the
Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the United States did not rely on
nuclear threats to attempt to halt the insurgency or resupply
of the Communists in the South from the North.
Even during the December Bombings of 1972, nuclear threats
were conspicuously absent. While the political aims of the
Nixon administration were similar to those of the Eisenhower
administration during the Korean war (to force the adversary
back to the negotiating table to accept terms favorable to the
United States short of victory), there were no similar nuclear
threats. Even more striking, however, was the domestic and
international backlash to the bombing campaign. As one author
noted, "the surge of domestic criticism dismayed both military
and civil leadership.'7L Clearly, the domestic pressures
7 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 89.
-Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 191.
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that the United States faced with respect to the conduct of
the war after 1967 would not have allowed a President to use
overt nuclear threats against the North Vietnamese.
Interestingly, while succeeding U.S. administrations felt
restrained from making nuclear threats against nonnuclear
North Vietnam, in 1973 the Nixon administration relied on
nuclear threats to counter Soviet moves in the Middle East. It
is not known if, and to what extent, covert nuclear threats
may have been used in Vietnam; but it is clear that the
United States did not use its nuclear arsenal explicitly to
coerce the communist enemy as during the Korean War.
Recently during the Gulf War, there again was a
conspicuous lack of U.S. nuclear coercion, even though Iraq
was not a nuclear power. Although one can argue that the
United States did rely on implicit nuclear threats against
Iraq, it is clear that domestic and international pressures
precluded the coalition, and in particular the United States,
from explicitly threatening nuclear retaliation in response to
possible Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
The Bush administration warned the Iraqis that the United
States would retaliate if chemical weapons were used. What is
not clear is what form American or coalition retaliation would
have taken. While President Bush never publicly ruled out the
use of nuclear weapons, he also never explicitly threatened
their use. From early in the crisis, President Bush tried to
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leave all his potential responses to Iraq open, while trying
to avoid using explicit nuclear threats.
On February 5, 1991, President Bush responded to questions
on possible American responses to Iraqi chemical weapons
attacks by stating:
Well, I think it's better to never say what option you
may be considering or may or may not do. . . . I would
like to take the opportunity, in responding to your
question to say he [Saddam Hussein] ought to think very
carefully about doing that. Very, very carefully. And I
will leave that up to a very fuzzy interpretation because
I would like to have every possible chance that he decide
not to do this [use chemical weapons]."
Bush's statement may have hinted at nuclear weapons use in
response to chemical weapons use. Due to the varied
backgrounds of the coalition, however, it is quite probable
that the administration believed that it would be politically
impossible to respond to an Iraqi chemical weapon attack with
a retaliatory use of weapons of mass destruction. It seems
highly unlikely that in a "new world order" the international
community, much less the Arab community, would have accepted
a nuclear weapons response to chemical attack as in keeping
with the principles of such a "new world order." In all
likelihood, a nuclear response would have seemed
disproportionate.
Moreover, by the time President Bush made his remarks the
air war was well in progress. Most, if not all, of the
74
"Excerpts from Talk by Bush on Gulf War," New York
Times, 6 February 1991, A10.
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potential targets that analysts had said nuclear weapons might
be used against were already being attacked with conventional
weapons. Even hardened targets that posed problems for early
conventional attacks were being slated for attack with new
larger-yield conventional weapons that would have negated the
need for nuclear weapons use. 7' The use of nuclear weapons
on, for example, super-hardened command and control facilities
in Iraq would have almost certainly caused significant numbers
of civilian deaths. As it was, the destruction of an Iraqi
command and control center that held a number of Iraqi
civilians caused noteworthy controversy both within the United
States and throughout the international community. 7"
Many have commented that Saddam Hussein did not believe
that the Americans were truly resolved to remove his forces
from Kuwait. It must also be said that he never showed any
signs of believing that the United States would resort to
nuclear weapons. While no one can claim to know Saddam's
thoughts and cognitive process, an argument can be made that
past U.S. performance, both in the Middle East and Southeast
75See DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An
Interim Report to Congress, (Washington D.C.: Department of
Defense, 1991), 8-1.
"7For an account of the bombing and the political effects
of the bombing, see Andrew Rosental, "Bush's Quandry," New
York Times, 14 Feb. 1991, Al, A17; Craig Whitney, "Bombing
Puts Britain's Government on Defensive," Ibid., A19; Peter
Applebome, "Carnage in Baghdad Erases Image of an Antiseptic
War," Ibid.; Clyde Haberman, "Arabs in Many Nations Protest
Bombing," Ibid., 15 Feb. 1991, A13.
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Asia, may have led him to believe that the United States would
not have the political will to conduct an all-out war, much
less to use nuclear weapons, against Iraq's military and
political leadership. A few remarks by Saddam Hussein may
shed light on his misconceptions:
Rather: What are the chances that you underestimate the
power of the United States military? What are the chances
that a quick, powerful strike could knock you out
immediately?
Hussein: No single strike, however destructive, however
potential, can destroy a whole people. The United States
relies on the Air Force, and the air force has never been
the decisive factor in a battle in the history of wars.
Rather: If you are attacked by the United States-
Hussein: You mean if we are attacked by the United
States from Saudi Territory."'
One can easily interpret Saddam's remarks as those of a man
who did not fear the American military or its nuclear weapons.
One can also speculate that Saddam did not fear U.S. nuclear
responses because: (1) there were no explicit nuclear threats
made by the United States, and (2) the United States has had
a recent history of not threatening non-nuclear adversaries
with potential nuclear strikes." While not eliminating the
need for nuclear deterrence, all of these factors combine to
77"Excerpts From Interview With Hussein on Crisis in
Gulf," New York Times, 31 Aug. 1990, A10.
78See Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, statement to the
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, cited in United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agreements: Text and Histories of Negotiations
([Washington D.C.] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1982), 87. (See footnote 68)
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increase the attractions of "conventional deterrence
capabilities."
E. SUMMARY
American deterrence theory has gone through an evolution.
Nuclear weapons were seen early in their history as weapons
that could save American lives. Because of their relative
inexpcn-iveness, many of the political shortcomings of the
weapons were overlooked. As the U.S. monopoly vanished and
the declining American superiority in nuclear weapons became
evident, many questioned the utility of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons offered great destructive potential, but
relatively little discrimination, while at the same time
increasingly offering tne chance of greater American
casualties in the event of a nuclear war. Thus, principal
precepts of the American way of war and just war theory - the
idea that war should remain limited to combatants and that
American lives should be conserved - were hard to reconcile
with the probable consequences of a major nuclear war with the
Soviets. Because of the conflict between the American way of
war and the perceived probable outcome of a nuclear war, much
of the previously projected utility of nuclear weapons for
military operations was lost.
As history has shown, the number of missions in which
nuclear weapons has been considered politically useful has
continued to decline. Because of domestic and international
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perceptions of nuclear weapons, it has for many years been
less credible than it was in the 1950s to threaten nuclear
weapons use against nonnuclear nations. At the same time the
perception that nuclear war between the two superpowers would
mean national suicide has increasingly meant that many believe
the only mission nuclear weapons are useful for is deterring
nuclear attack on the United States. The likelihood that
nuclear deterrence, especially with regard to regional
conflicts, will continue to be less politically relevant makes
it increasingly important to find credible alternatives to
nuclear threats.
Advances in the technologies of precision, discrimination,
and control mean the West can choose not to rely on the
incredible threat of indiscriminate destruction of
innocent civilians to deter war. The West can choose a
strategy that protects and defends its values, not one
that is at odds with them.7 •
The delegitimization of nuclear deterrence appears likely
to persist, especially in the presence of non-nuclear
alternative military policies. For, as Adam Garfinkle notes,
Sometimes the moral and the practical merge, most
notably in the reasoning that holds [nuclear] deterrence
to be less attractive morally to the extent that practical
alternatives to it, political or technical, may exist or
come to exist. In other words, it is morally acceptable
to tolerate the lesser of many evils on the condition that
once it stops being the lesser of many evils, one stops
tolerating it.80
"Paul Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 261.
"ScAdam Garfinkle, "The Attack on Deterrence: Reflections
on Morality and Strategic Praxis," Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1989, 166.
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III. TECHNICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the period from the 1950s to the end of cne cold war in
1989/1991, nuclear weapons were seen as an economical way to
amass military power. While some political liabilities were
acknowledged, for the most part it seemed that the continued
development and deployment of nuclear weapons was assured. In
the new global political climate, however, environmental
concerns associated with the deployment, and possible wartime
use of nuclear weapons have emerged from relative obscurity
and have placed U.S.nuclear weapons production capabilities in
question.
This chapter examines contemporary environmental concerns
concerning nuclear weapons. Contemporary concerns over the
effects of nuclear weapons increased greatly with the
popularization of the "nuclear winter" theory in 1983. While
the "nuclear winter" theory may be seen as "poor science" by
informed decision-makers, this chapter reviews evidence
suggesting that the general public and many of the elite
public either believe the theory to be valid, or have enough
unanswered questions, that the "nuclear winter" theory still
plays a part in the average American's opinion of the
usability of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the current state
of U.S. nuclear weapons production facilities and the
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contemporary apprehensions over nuclear weapons safety are
examined. Lastly, the chapter considers some military
liabilities associated with the storage, transportation, and
use of nuclear weapons.
Widespread environmental concerns, along with the changes
in the current global political climate, have combined to make
it harder, if not impossible, to convince the U.S. Congress of
the need to build new, or to reopen old, Department of Energy
nuclear production facilities. A decision not to build or
reinstate production facilities could well mean that the
United States will be constrained to a relatively small
nuclear force. Moreover, if the political will to reopen old,
or open new, nuclear weapons production facilities faltered,
the United States could effectively lose much of its
industrial capability to build nuclear weapons both now and in
the future.
A. THE "NUCLEAR WINTER" EPISODE AND ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS
Any discussion of contemporary environmental concerns over
nuclear weapons must begin by examining the popular theory of
"Nuclear Winter." The nuclear winter theory first gained
popular attention in 1983 with the publication of the so-
called TTAPS study, so named for the initials of the
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authors. 8  Carl Sagan emerged to become the foremost
spokesman of the nuclear winter theory regarding the possible
consequences of a nuclear exchange. He made the theory known
to the general public with his many appearances on television
talk shows and appearances before Congress.
The TTAPS article discussed numerous nuclear exchange
scenarios trom 100 to 25,000 MT.
The nuclear winter theory postulates that even a minor
nuclear exchange, especially if it is targeted on cities,
would generate massive amounts of soot and dust that would
be lifted by superheated air over burning target areas
into the upper atmosphere, blocking sunlight from the
Earth's surface and plunging much of the world into frigid
gloom.
The article concluded with seven tentative conclusions, all of
which combined to paint an apocalyptical scenario, even at
levels of destruction that were previously believed to involve
relatively small numbers of nuclear weapons. According to the
TTAPS report:
Relatively large climatic effects could result even from
relatively small nuclear exchanges (100 to 1000 MT) if
urban areas were heavily targeted, because as little as
100 MT is sufficient to devastate and burn several hundred
of the world's major urban areas. Such a low threshold
yield for massive smoke emissions, although scenario-
dependent, implies that even limited nuclear exchanges
could trigger severe aftereffects."3
81R.P. Turco et al., "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences
of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," Science, 23 December 1983,
(referred to as the TTAPS Study).
82J. J. Gertler, Some Policy Implications of Nuclear




More alarming, perhaps, was the accompanying article
entitled the "Long-Term Biological Consequences of War.1'"4
The authors attempted to set a threshold for the occurrence
of "nuclear winter." They concluded by setting a theoretical
limit of 500 MT. 85 Moreover, they claimed that in a limited
war of 500 MT or less it seemed "unlikely that even in these
circumstances Homo sapiens would be forced to extinction
immediately."'8 6  The report went on to say, however, "[i]n
any large-scale nuclear exchange between the superpowers
. the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be
excluded. ,8 7
Almost immediately after the report was published it was
attacked by scientists for its failure to respect scientific
methodologies and dismissed as "poor science" by most
researchers. One of the first and most important criticisms of
the TTAPS report was that it relied on a one-dimensional
model. Therefore,
it did not take into account north-south and east-west
directions, but instead treated the earth as a homogeneous
all-land sphere having a temperature that depended oi.ly on
up-down direction (atmospheric altitude) . Thus, the model
had no geography, no winds, no seasons, instantaneous
spread of smoke to the hemispheric scale, and no feedback
84Paul R. Erlich et al., "The Long-Term Biological





of atmospheric circulation changes on the rate of smoke
washout by rainfall. 88
When a more sophisticated three-dimensional model was
developed and run, significantly different results occurred.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research developed a
three-dimensional model and ran three scenarios using three
different amounts of moderately black smoke. The initial
findings were reported in an article entitled "Nuclear Winter
Reappraised," in the Summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs.
The authors concluded the following:
the oceans, with their vast storage of heat, would reduce
the magnitude of average continental cooling by a factor
of two in summer, compares to the cooling calculated by
assuming a land-covered planet. . . . the average
temperature changes from the northern hemisphere mid-
latitudes are considerably smaller than the original
estimates of one-dimensional models ....... .The reasons
for the moderation of temperature compared to the original
calculations are well understood. First, the oceans have
a large heat capacity, which ameliorates the cooling over
land. Second, about three-fourths of the smoke is removed
from the model's atmosphere over the course of 30 days.
Third, the infrared "greenhouse" effect of the smoke, does
produce a significant mitigation of the surface cooling.
We must stress that our results are for July, the month in
which the temperature changes are likely to be the
largest.`'
Additionally, the TTAPS report assumes that urban areas
would be heavily targeted and that at least 100 MT aggregate
yield would be used against urban areas. The most likely U.S.
88Stanley L. Thompson and Stephen Schneider, "Nuclear




and NATO nuclear employment strategies, however, involved much
less than 100 MT aggregate yield. 91 Furthermore, U.S. and
NATO nuclear strategy included a conscious decision to largely
avoid urban areas, opting instead for military targets in
relatively unpopulated areas in selective employment plans
intended to end hostilities and restore deterrence.
One of the most critical reviews came from Russell Seitz,
who called the nuclear winter theory "a politicization of
science sufficient to result in the advertizing of mere
conjecture as hard fact." 9 ' According to Seitz,
One way to see the TTAPS model is as a long series of
conjectures: if this mich smoke goes up, if it is this
dense, if it rose like this, and so on. This series of
coin tosses was represented to laymen and scientists alike
as a "sophisticated one-dimensional model" - a usage that
is oxymoronic . . . For while there might be a "clear
possibility" of a dire outcome on any single one of the
model's forty elements, the probability of so long a
string of coin tosses all coming up heads is
astronomical.'`
While nuclear winter remains a discredited theory, some
continue to insist that the possibility of nuclear winter
still exists. Moreover, while experts on nuclear weapons and
their effects are familiar with the serious doubts associated
with the nuclear winter theory, most of the general public is
apt not to be familiar with these doubts. Because of the vast
"ý"See Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and
None," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1985), 978-979.
92Russell Seitz, "In From the Cold: 'Nuclear Winter' Melts
Down," The National Interest, Fall 1986, 3.
'Ibid., 5.
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amounts of time and effort spent on disseminating the theory
to the public, early on, and the almost complete absence of
popular critical reviews of the theory (such as on the front
page of the New York Times or the top story on the evening
news), a large portion of the general public may still be
convinced that nuclear winter is a valid theory. Others,
moreover, while questioning the validity of the nuclear winter
theory, prescribe nuclear weapons policy alternatives that
take nuclear winter into consideration (e.g. Colin Gray 94 ,
Philip Romero9", and J. Gertler96). These prescribed
policies give credibility to the theory simply by taking it
into account.
Increasingly, those who oppose nuclear weapons rely on
environmental concerns of the general public, such as the
possibility of nuclear winter, to attack the need for large
numbers of nuclear weapons. Added to the fear of nuclear
winter are increasing concerns over the safety and reliability
of the nuclear weapons production complex and of the weapons
themselves.
9 4Colin S. Gray, "The Nuclear Winter Thesis and U.S.
Strategic Policy," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, 85-
98.
"95Philip Romero, Nuclear Winter: Implications for U.S. and
Soviet Nuclear Strategy (Washington D.C.: The Rand
Corporation, P-7009, August 1984).
0J.J. Gertler, Some Policy Implications of Nuclear
Winter, (Washington D.C.: The Rand Corporation, P-7045,
January 1985).
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B. THE STATE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Recently, increased environmental awareness and the end of
Cold War tensions have brought public attention to a number of
safety and environmental shortcomings at key U.S. nuclear
weapons production facilities. With the revelations has come
the almost complete shutdown of U.S. nuclear weapons
production capabilities. According to Pat Towell,
As a result of the new, tighter scrutiny, four reactors
that produced nuclear material for weapons conctrliction in
1986 have been closed -- one of them permanently -- because
of environmental, health or safety problems. Other plants
that make key nuclear weapons components have been shut
down at intervals for the same reasons.
The Reed Report draws a similar picture of a suspended weapons
building capability:
Currently the U.S. is producing no plutonium or highly
enriched uranium, nor does it have the capacity to
fabricate (i.e., cast, machine, and otherwise shape) the
plutonium it already has. •
Moreover, environmental concerns over the state of nuclear
production facilities have made it easier for critics of
nuclear weapons to challenge the continued need for nuclear
weapons production. According to Pat Towell,
liberal activists, who have opposed many weapons-
production plants for arms control reasons, have seized on
S-Pat Towell, "Will Fear of Accidental Blasts Torpedo
Activists' Plan?," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 2
June 1990, 1733.
°•Reed and Wheeler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New
World Order, 35.
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the environmental issue as a lever to slow the
government's weapons-making capability. 9 9
U.S. nuclear weapons production facilities are in
desperate need of modernization. Current production reactors
are generally 35 to 50 years old. During the defense buildup
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the system showed definite
signs of age. Pat Towell writes that "the defense buildup
begun by President Jimmy Carter and accelerated by President
Ronald Reagan imposed considerable strains on the aging
weapons plants. '110
In 1988, to relieve some of the pressure on the old
weapons plants and in an effort to modernize, the Department
of Energy proposed the construction of two new production
reactors. One was to be built at the Savannah River site,
while the other was to be built in Idaho. To date, however,
no construction has begun on either plant. Moreover, "even
some staunch backers of the weapons complex have doubts about
the cost of a two-reactor plan -- projected to be $6.8 billion
dollars.'"I" The DOE also called for the construction of a
third production facility that would use lasers to refine
plutonium. According to Pat Towell,
qýPat Towell, "Need For Massive Cleanup May Slow Weapon-






Last year Congress approved only $40 million of the $150
million requested for the SIS [Special Isotope Separation]
plant. And it barred work at the construction site until
[Energy Secretary James] Watkins certified that the plant
was essential for national security. 02
In November 1991, the Department of Energy "postponed for
at least two years its decision on how and where to build a
new reactor to produce materials for nuclear bombs.'n 1 3
According to a statement issued by Secretary Watkins,
This should in no way be seen as a decision not to build
the new production reactor. On the contrary, this will
insure a more deliberative decision, making the final
decision more reflective of our newly defined defense
needs and environmental concerns.)0
One may, however, wonder about the prospects for a new
production reactor in an era of increasing environmental
awareness, decreasing faith in the legitimacy of nuclear
deterrence, increasing cleanup costs, and decreasing
availability of funds for military expenditures (including
funds for nuclear weapons production facilities) . Clearly, at
least for the near term, the ability of the Department of
Energy to build new nuclear weapons production facilities is
in question. Probable technological advances in conventional
weapons could conceivably make it more difficult to convince
102Ibid., 183.
'•°John H. Cushman, Jr., "Energy Dept. Halts Decision On




the Congress and the American public of the need for such
facilities in the long term.
Because of the lack of movement in the construction of new
production reactors and the deteriorating state of existing
tritium, the Department of Energy recognized something had to
be done. Therefore, experts were not surprised that Energy
Secretary Watkins chose to restart the K-reactor at the
Savannah River plant. The attempted restart of the K-reactor
in December 1991, however, only served to highlight the
current ills of U.S. nuclear weapons production facilities.
1. The Restart of the Savannah River Plant
The Savannah River Plant "produces tritium and
plutonium [and] recycles uranium.""- The three reactors at
the Savannah River Plant near Aiken, South Carolina, have been
closed since 1988. 2' Because of the closure of "the
country's sole source of tritium,''C7  theze has been no
production of tritium in the United States for almost four
years. Tritium is an essential element of a nuclear warhead
which boosts the explosive force of the weapon. It is
important to realize that tritium decays. The Reed Report
'
1
'Kenneth E. Jaques, "Status, Problems and Cleanup Costs
of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Plants," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, 20 January 1990, 181.
106Towell, "Need For Massive Cleanup May Slow Weapon-
Building," 181.
"'
0 7Keith Schneider, "Tainting by Tritium Found Near
Weapons Plants," New York Times, 9 November, 1991, A7 .
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indicated that "The reopening of the K-reactor may resolve the
problem of no tritium production."'' 8 According to Pat
Towell,
Because tritium decays at the rate of 5.5 percent
annually, the tritium supplies in warheads must be
replenished regularly. For a time, the Pentagon could
keep most of its warheads charged with tritium by
scavenging gas from less important weapons. But at some
point, a significant number of U.S. warheads will begin
losing their punch." 9
Secretary of Energy James Watkins ordered the restart
of the K-reactor on December 13, 1991,"c to "begin a period
of demonstration and testing . . . to show that it is possible
to operate it safely and efficiently, restoring the supply of
tritium.""' During the startup of the reactor, however, 150
gallons of radioactive coolant water leaked into the Savannah
River. "The leak went undetected for two days because the
official in charge of authorizing transportation of water
samples to a nearby laboratory was out with the flu.'"•:
Problems such as the one that occurred in December
1991 are not uncommon at the Savannah Plant. "In 1987, for
•Reed and Wheeler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the
New World Order, 35.
'°"Towell, "Need For Massive Cleanup May Slow Weapon-
Building," 179,182.
11uPeter Applebome, "Anger Lingers After Leak at Atomic
Site," New York Times, January 13, 1992, A7.
""Cushman, "Energy Dept. Halts Decision On Building
Nuclear Piant," A10.
'12Applebome, "Anger Lingers After Leak at Atomic Site,"
A7.
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instance, a mistake by a maintenance worker released 172,400
curies of tritium at Savannah River, or nearly 18 grams of
tritium, enough for roughly five nuclear weapons.
Repeated leaks and an apparent lack of concern by both the
companies managing the facility and the DOE have caused some
residents of the area to call for the permanent shutdown of
the facility.
At a hearing, one man said, "I'd like to see them shut
down the plant for this reason: We have not used a nuclear
weapon since World War II. We're not killing our enemies.
We're killing ourselves.""114 Kevin Knoblock of the Union of
Concerned Scientists said, "[w]e ought to stop fretting about
where the next supply of tritium will come from and think
instead of not needing it at all."'2 5
Even if the Department of Energy decides not to reopen
the Savannah River Plant, considerable expenditures in time
and money will be required to clean up the waste problems of
the facilities. Moreover, the managing staff of the facility
faces severe credibility problems when it comes to its
sincerity in dealing with environmental concerns of area
residents. "One of the most disturbing disclosures is that
"113 Schneider "Tainting by Tritium Found Near Weapons
Plants," A7.
"




between 1955 and 1983 low-level nuclear waste from the plant
was disposed of in cardboard boxes, dumped in shallow trenches
and shoveled over."'"6
2. Cleanup Requirements for DOE Nuclear Weapons
Production Facilities
The Savannah River Plant is not unique. All seventeen
of the nuclear weapons plants of the Department of Energy face
environmental cleanup and/or safety problems. Pat Towell
described the Department of Energy's cleanup woes as follows:
Operating in secret, and exempt from many safety
precautions and waste disposal practices required of
civilian industrial plants, the weapons complex has
produced a mountain of toxic and radioactive waste, which,
by the Energy Department's own estimate, will cost $150
billion to $200 billion over 30 years to clean up.117
The Department of Energy is faced with having to clean
up its facilities before, or in conjunction with, their
reopening. While previously the Department of Energy was able
to violate hazardous materials laws with impunity,
increasingly there are calls for the Department of Energy to
be held to the same standards that apply to other
manufacturers. Recently, in fact, the Environmental
Protection Agency, frustrated with the progress in clean up,
levied a $372,000 fine on the Department of Energy. DOE
116Stephen Holden "Review/Film: A Turn for the Worse At
the A-Bomb Factory," New York Times, October 12, 1990, Y16.
117Pat Towell, "Recruiting Defense Dollars For
Environmental Duty," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
7 July 1990, 2134.
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refused to pay the fine, saying that the EPA lacked
jurisdiction."' Moreover, since the Reagan administration
a trend has developed of states willing to pressure the DOE
into complying with environmental laws. "The Governors of
Colorado and Idaho have threatened to enforce limits on
amounts of toxic waste that could be stored, even at the risk
of closing the weapons-production network."..19
Many attempts bv states to require the DOE to comply
with existing federal and state environmental laws have been
defeated by the DOE claiming the "'sovereign immunity' of the
federal government against states' efforts to enforce their
environmental regulations.''"' Efforts are underway in
Congress, however, to waive the ability of the federal
government to claim "sovereign immunity." "The U.S. House
. . overwhelmingly approved a bill (HR 1056) last July [1989]
that would waive the 'sovereign immunity' of the federal
government against states' efforts to enforce their
environmental regulations."'1I The Senate has yet to pass a
similar bill, but one has been introduced by Sen. George
Mitchell (D. Maine). Nonetheless, it is apparent that the
1 18Phillip A. Davis, "Rising Cleanup Costs," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 April 1991, 852.
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nuclear weapons production complex is coming under increasing
pressure to abide by environmental regulations from both
within and outside the federal government.
Not only are there serious questions as to whether the
Un,'ted States will regain its ability to produce nuclear
weapons, but recent reports have brought into question the
safety of a number of current U.S. nuclear weapons.
Revelations such as those that appeared in the 1990 Drell
Report raise the question of whether environmental and safety
risks will be perceived as justified by the current global
political situation.
C. CONCERNS OVER THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF CURRENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The safety of nuclear weapons has long been an important
concern. In the 1950s many worried about the fate of nuclear
weapons on airborne alert bombers. What has changed is that
in the past most of the publicly expressed concerns for
nuclear weapons safety came from outside of the government,
whereas in 1990 the most prominent concerns over nuclear
weapons safety originated from within the government. Just as
in the case of the nuclear weapons production problems, the
safety problems with many of the current weapons arose because
of the past emphasis on getting the biggest "bang for the
buck" with little, if any, regard for increased safety
possibilities. As the Drell Report states,
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During this period [from the 1950s until the late 1980s),
a large nuclear weapons stockpile was built in the
chilling environment of the Cold War. Modernization and
improvement programs gave priority to military
requirements, such as achieving maximum yield-to-weight
ratios for warheads and maximum payloads and ranges for
missiles. Safety in general was not viewed with the same
urgency . . . Modification of stockpile weapons in order
to bring them up to modern safety criteria has proceeded
slowly . . . As a result, in anticipation of acquiring new
weapons systems, many older ones remain in today's nuclear
stockpile that do not meet present nuclear weapons design
criteria.122
One of the first signs of concern from within the nuclear
weapons establishment came in May 1990 when, as Pat Towell
reports, "[t]he directors of the Energy Department's three
weapons laboratories recommended to the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that the Pentagon remove from
service 1,000-plus SRAM-A short range attack missiles carried
by B-52 and B-lB bombers."n23 Fears began to mount that
with respect to at least three types of nuclear warheads there
was a great potential for accidental nuclear explosion. Fears
grew when advanced mathematical analysis showed not only the
possibility of large amounts of highly radioactive plutonium
being scattered for miles, in the event of the chemical
explosive detonating, but more importantly the possibility of
an unintended nuclear explosion being set off by such an
explosion. According to Pat Towell,
'22Sidney D. Drell, Chairman, John S. Foster, Jr., Charles
H. Townes, Report of The Panel On Nuclear Weapons Safety of
the House Armed Services Committee, December 1990, 11.
"•
3Towell, "Will Fear of Accidental Blasts Torpedo
Activists' Plan?," 1733.
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The first hint of a safety problem came . . . with the
W-79 warhead used in the Army's 8-inch nuclear artillery
shells. The warhead's high explosives could be detonated
if a shell was dropped by its handlers or struck by a
stray bullet. If such an incident occurred while the
shell was loaded in a gun, some analysts warned, it might
conceivably result in a nuclear blast.' 24
Arguably, the most important nuclear weapon system that
was cited by a number of analysts as posing potential safety
hazards was the new Trident II D-5 missile used to equip the
most modern U.S. SSBNs. Not only were there questions about
the warhead itself, but there were also questions about the
design of the missile.
It must first be understood that a submarine-launched
missile operates under a size constraint that a land-based
missile does not. The Trident II D-5 missile was designed to
achieve the greatest range and throw weight possible within
the size constraints imposed upon it by being deployed within
a submarine. When the missile was first designed, the
decision was made to use traditional high explosive components
instead of using new and safer insensitive explosive
components. The decision to use the more volatile explosives
was based on the fact that the new insensitive explosives
weighed more than the older high-energy explosives. The Drell
Report explains the tradeoff:
In contrast to its safety advantages IHE contains, pound
for pound, only about two-thirds the energy of HE and,
therefore, is needed in a greater weight and volume for
initiating the detonation of a nuclear warhead. Hence the
"':4Ibid., 1734.
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yield-to-weight ratio decreases for a nuclear warhead when
IHE replaces HE. 12 5
Translated into layman's terms, if the warhead were
constructed with IHE, it would be heavier, which would
translate into shorter ranges for the missile.
The Drell Report, in light of safety concerns, made a
number of recommendations to enhance the safety of key nuclear
weapons. Recommendations included considering using
insensitive high- explos ives on all nuclear warheads and
installing fire-resistant pits designed to stand up to the
temperatures that would be encountered in an aircraft fire,
and (where needed) designed to stand up to the higher
temperatures that would be encountered in a missile propellent
fire. Additionally, the Commission recommended switching to
non-detonable propellants, especially with respect to the
Trident II D-5 third stage.
The third stage of the Trident II D-5 missile is currently
equipped with high-energy propellent that may detonate under
certain circumstances. Because the third stage is surrounded
by the bus that carries the nuclear warheads, there is the
possibility of nuclear detonation in the event of a propellent
detonation. The Report states:
The D5 missile . . . is designed with a through-deck
configuration in order to fit within the geometric
constraints of the submarine hull and at the same time
achieve maximum range with three boost stages. In this
121Drell, Report of The Panel On Nuclear Weapons Safety of
the House Armed Services Committee, 19.
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configuration the nuclear warheads are mounted on the
post-boost vehicle (PBV) in a circular configuration
around . . the third stage motor. Thus if the third
stage motor were to detonate in a submarine loading
accident . . . a patch of motor fragments could impact
the side of the reentry bodies encasing each warhead.
The concern is whether some combination of such off-axis
multi-point impacts would detonate the HE surrounding the
nuclear pit and lead to plutonium dispersal or possibly a
nuclear yield.' 2 6
The report goes on to predict that in light of future
reductions in the number of warheads that may be placed on the
Trident II D-5 missile, the possibility exists for equipping
the Trident II D-5 with "IHE, non-detonable 1.3 class
propellent and a fire-resistant pit," and it then "could fly
to even longer ranges than at present.".-
D. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Even if the federal government decides to spend the
required money on nuclear weapons production facilities, the
chances that local governments and citizens will accept the
associated risks are uncertain. An example of the worsening
problems for nuclear weapons production is the lawsuit that
DOE recently settled. According to Phillip Davis,
nuclear bomb plants -- once coveted for
attendant jobs and salaries -- now evoke another image.
It is one of pollution spewing into the air and hazardous
wastes marring the nation's landscapes.
Such ominous images were brought home by a Cincinnati
federal court settlement in 1989. The Energy Department





production plant in Fernald, Ohio, for emotional distress
and impairment of property values." 8
Additionally, the DOE faces a severe roadblock to restarting
production at its nuclear facilities because of the lack of a
storage site for radioactive waste materials.
On 5 October 1991, DOE announced that it would open the
first permanent nuclear waste repository near Carlsbad, New
Mexico. Energy Secretary Watkins bypassed Congressional
approval by declaring the site ready to accept the first
shipments of nuclear waste. Political leaders in Washington,
D.C. and New Mexico strongly protested and vowed to initiate
lawsuits in an attempt to stop the opening. 121 On 9 October
1991, the DOE was forced to delay the opening of the nuclear
waste repository. According to Keith Schneider:
Faced with a state lawsuit and growing political
opposition in New Mexico, the United States Department of
Energy today [9 October] postponed at least until the end
of November the opening of the nation's first permanent
nuclear repository.`3
The importance of the waste repository is compounded by the
fact that many of the weapons production plants are reaching
their limits on the ability to temporarily store wastes.131
128Davis, "Rising Cleanup Costs," 852.
"
129Keith Schneider, "U.S. Schedules Opening of Nuclear
Waste Site," New York Times, 6 October 1991, A18.
"'
3 Keith Schneider, "U.S. Delays Opening of a Waste Site,"
New York Times, 10 October 1991, A19.
131 See Towell, "Need For Massive Cleanup,' 182, and
Schneider, "U.S. Delays Opening," A19, column 3.
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It seems that all over the West, state governments,
concerned citizens, and American Indian groups are joining in
an effort to stop nuclear wastes from being dumped in their
states. On 26 November 1991, Federal District Court Judge
John Garret Penn issued an injunction that barred the DOE from
opening the nuclear repository, and on 31 January 1992 he
ruled that DOE must seek Congressional approval along with New
Mexico's before opening the repository.' 32
More important, however, may be DOE's announcement that it
has postponed its decision on where and when to open a new
nucl~ar weapons production plant, because of recent unilateral
nuclear arms reductions."'33  "Arms control experts outside
the Government say the declining number of warheads in the
ars nal and the new supplies of tritium [tritium scavenged
frcm retired nuclear weapons] make a new reactor unnecessary
for decades."u1 34  A decision in 1993 or 1994 to build a new
pro~luction facility would still take years to translate into
a c)mpleted production facility, especially in light of the
13 2See Keith Schneider, "U.S. Judge Bars Energy Secretary
Fron Opening Nuclear Waste Repository," New York Times, 27
November 1991, A9. I-em, "Judge Halts Dump For Atomic Waste,"
New York Times, 28 November 1991, A10. Matthew L. Wald,
"Judge Blocks Federal Plan to Open Plutonium Dump," New York
Times, 4 February 1992, A7.
1





legal fights that the federal government would certainly face
in trying to open a new facility.
E. MILITARY LIABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In addition to the disincentives for continued reliance on
nuclear weapons already discussed, there are military
liabilities associated with nuclear weapons both during
peacetime and wartime operations. Peacetime liabilities
include added security needed for the guarding of the weapons
and additional inspections and qualifications that are
required of military personnel and units, along with the
additional medical and psychological supervision of personnel
assigned to billets that involve nuclear weapons.
The military also has to worry about electrical phenomena
that are associated with nuclear weapons use. Among the best-
known is the phenomenon called Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).
For years the military was aware of this phenomenon, but now
with the widespread use of integrated circuits in military
hardware, it has become a more pressing concern. EMP has a
tendency to destroy integrated electric circuits. Therefore,
the United States has had to spend addi-ional billions of
dollars on "hardening" weapons systems against the effects of
EMP. EMP can disable both the attacker's and/or defender's
military equipment. In a conflict with a non-nuclear power,
however, the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States
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would ensure that none of its military equipment was disabled
by accidental EMP.
Other practical military reasons exist to desire a more
discriminate application of force. According to Paul
Kozemchak,
A military target can be destroyed in two ways: a large
nuclear weapon can be dropped somewhere near it, or a much
smaller weapon, in some cases a nonnuclear one, can be
dropped directly on it. With the large weapon, the target
may be destroyed, but much more of value might be damaged
along with it. Some of these valuables might belong to
friends. Some might in fact be friends or potential
allies ... But with the smaller, more accurate weapon, we
could destroy what we aim at and only what we aim at. 3"'
The value of arguments such as Kozemchak's was not lost on the
Soviets. Notra Trulock observed that "one clear implication
the Soviets have drawn regards the promise of levels of
destruction achieved through conventional fires that were
formerly possible only through the employment of nuclear
weapons. Particularly intriguing is the possibility of
fulfilling damage criteria with a fairly high degree of
confidence but without the collateral damage and operational
complications inherent in nuclear strikes." "'
In short, both the United States and the Soviet Union
realized in the 1980s that any use of nuclear weapons might
have greater costs than benefits to the attacker. These costs
-'35Paul Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and
Nonnuclear Weapons," 262.
"'Trulock, Hines, and Herr, Soviet Military Thought in
Transition, 45.
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could range from the moral and political liabilities to
practical military liabilities.
An enlightening example of the military liabilities of
using nuclear weapons near one's own forces or allied forces
comes from the U.S. Army in the mid-1950's. In 1955 the Army
tried to prove its tactics to fight in a nuclear environment
through a series of tests involving Army personnel near
nuclear detonations. As Andrew Bacevich writes:
The most important was a well publicized operation called
Desert Rock VI conducted at Yucca Flat, Nevada, and
involving a composite armored force, Task Force Razor,
positioned 3,000 meters (about two miles) from a 30-
kiloton (30,000 tons of TNT) atomic device. When the
device was detonated a choking dust and terrifying flash
of light instantly filled the vehicles nearest to ground
zero .... After the detonation the task force had advanced
in a tight wedge formation to facilitate control- with
every vehicle monitoring a single radio frequency and many
turning on their lights to help in keeping station through
the heavy dust thrown up by the blast. The Army had
calibrated the shot to minimize any radiation hazard,
hoping thereby to permit the armor to attack directly
across ground zero. As it turned out, however, that when
the lead elements reached a point 890 meters (a little
over a half mile) from ground zero the radiation level
inside the tanks had reached 10 roentgens per hour,
forcing the commander to order a 90-degree turn away from
the assigned objective. 137
While these results may not seem unnecessarily restrictive
on Army operations near nuclear detonations, the test was
seriously flawed by the unrealistic conditions. Three times
the test was postponed because the weather wasn't right. Each
armored vehicle was placed in the right position days prior to
the test, while thirty minutes prior to the explosion all the
1 7'Andrew Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 110-113.
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armored vehicles turned their turrets away from the explosion
and closed all hatches. All of these preparations were deemed
by the Army to be "impossible in a combat situation.""'
Not only does one have to face the problems associated
with advancing toward the site of a nuclear explosion, but if
friendly troops were near the explosion there would be a good
likelihood of inflicting unwanted or unforeseen damage to
those friendly forces. If advanced conventional weapons were
used, instead of a nuclear weapon, the chances of inflicting
casualties to friendly forces, as well as innocents, would be
reduced significantly. Therefore, there would also be fewer
political and moral liabilities. Moreover, since advanced
conventional weapons would not have any radiation hazards
associated %with their use, the ground forces would be able to
rapidly occupy the area struck if it were deemed necessary or
advisable. Thus, solely for damage limitation purposes, it
would be desirable to possess advanced conventional weapons to
substitute for tactical nuclear weapons.
F. SUMMARY
The Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety was able to make its
recommendations for replacing, or modifying, existing nuclear
weapons with safer weapons partly because of the fundamental






made numerous recommendations that would be expensive to
undertake. Replacing older nuclear weapons with newer, safer
ones would be expensive, even if the number of weapons built
to replace old ones was small. The cost of such a program
would have to be borne in conjunction with the concurrent cost
of cleaning up DOE nuclear facilities.
In light of recent trends in defense spending and the
popular call for a "peace dividend", it seems unlikely that
the United States will commit large sums to building new, or
reopening old, nuclear production facilities. As it is, it
could cost the federal government up to $300 billion to clean
up existing nuclear weapons production facilities.1 •9  To
expect Congress to authorize 6.8 billion dollars for new
production facilities, before any notable movement on the
cleanup of existing facilities has taken place, is probably
wishful thinking."'
In light of the Department of Energy's past performance
with its nuclear production facilities, it seems that the
ability of the administration to convince Congress, individual
states, and the American people that new production facilities
would be safe may be dubious. Moreover, in the minds of a
"'
3 Keith Schneider, "Scrapping Arms Raises Fears About
Plutonium," New York Times, 26 February 1992, A8.
"
4
°Towell writes that "even some staunch backers of the
weapons complex have doubts about the costs of a two-reactor
plan [proposed by the Energy Department in 1988] -- projected
to be $6.8 billion. Towell, "Need for a Massive Cleanup,"
183.
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number of average citizens "nuclear winter" may still be a
very real possibility, if not a probability, in the event of
nuclear war. Thus, with the performance of advanced
conventional weapons in Desert Storm in 1991 and conceivable
improvements in advanced conventional weapons capabilities
over the next few decades, public sentiments questioning the
need for (a) new nuclear weapons and (b) production facilities
for the production of critical components of existing nuclear
weapons can be expected to increase. In addition, President
Carter's January 1977 call for "the elimination of all nuclear
weapons from this Earth,'1 4 1 and President Reagan's March
1983 SDI speech along with recent moves by President Bush
drastically cutting the American nuclear arsenal have probably
increased the public's reservations about the desirability, or
need, for nuclear weapons. Thus, while Secretary Watkins
insists that the construction of a new weapons reactor will
eventually begin, the possibility exists of losing the
industrial base, not only to p-oduce new nuclear weapons, but
also to maintain existing weapons. If the construction of the
new production reactor is postponed long enough, and political
and military officials continue to develop non-nuclear strike
systems that reduce America's military-technical dependence
on nuclear weapons, Congress and the public at large may
141U.S., Presidents, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977), Jimmy
Carter, 1977, 3.
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eventually disbelieve claims of residual needs for nuclear
weapons capabilities.
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IV. THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS: THE EMERGING THREAT AND "CONVENTIONAL
DETERRENCE"
The previous two chapters highlighted a number of
disadvantages associated with nuclear weapons. The
disadvantages include the declining political utility of
nuclear weapons along with the prospect of possible future
U.S. nuclear weapons scarcity. These disadvantages, along with
the advantages that advanced conventional weapons offer, are
incentives for further research, development, and deployment
of advanced conventional weapons to accomplish missions
currently assigned to nuclear weapons. "The conventional
wisdom is, in shoi*., that stronger conventional forces are
needed to enhance conventional deterrence and thus compensate
for the declining effectiveness of nuclear deterrence."'4
The full range of advantages that advanced conventional
weapons can offer, however, will not be realized until the
government makes a conscious decision to pursue additional
types of strategic conventional weapons.14ý Available
14
' Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and
Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security,
Winter 1983-84, 34.
4 4The term strategic has become synonymous in the U.S.
with nuclear. However, the term "strategic conventional
weapons" refers to weapons that can strike targets deep within
the territory of an adversary that are deemed vital to the
conduct of the enemy's war plan. Targets might include, but
are not limited to: command, control, communication, and
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technology would allow conventional weapons to strike a
broader range of strategic targets. "More precise,
discriminate, and controllable weapons," as Paul Kozemchak
writes, "will not be designed and built in the absence of a
U.S. policy to that end.'"14" This chapter examines the
implications of a greater reliance on "conventional
deterrence" in light of the new global security environment.
It concludes that it is imperative that U.S. policy encourage
the further research, development, and deployment of strategic
conventional weapons and rely more heavily on strategic
conventional capabilities to deter potential adversaries.
Why would anyone call for a greater reliance on
conventional deterrence in light of almost fifty years of
apparently successful nuclear deterrence? The answer is that
"conventional deterrence" capabilities offer benefits in the
areas of damage limitation and escalation control and more
credible policy alternatives for regional military actions,
particularly in the light of recent global political and
military changes.
intelligence (C3I) cites, strategic military assets (e.g.,
airfields, ammunition depots, nuclear weapo.-s sites), or
military and political leaders.
44Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 262.
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A. THE TRADITIONAL SCENARIO
Over the past forty years, American nuclear strategists
have been almost wholly concerned with deterrence, crisis
stability and escalation control with regard to a
American/Soviet confrontation. Many claimed that after the
Soviets acquired nuclear weapons it was no longer credible to
make threats with American strategic nuclear forces for the
protection of Europe. It was deemed a reliance on a suicidal
threat. Tactical nuclear weapons were therefore introduced to
Europe, in the hope of reinforcing a credible threat of
nuclear escalation and avoiding a suicidal use of nuclear
weapons. Thus, it was hoped that a measure of escalation
control was inherent in "smaller" and more "discriminate"
nuclear weapons.
While tactical nuclear weapons were perceived as more
discriminate and less likely to be used on the territory of
either of the two superpowers, many claimed that the use of
nuclear weapons, no matter how discriminate, against either
superpower's forces would invite escalation to a higher level
of potential violence. 14" What was needed, according to many
analysts, was to increase the conventional ability to deter
atu c.k. Then, it was believed, the nuclear threshold would not
be crossed and the resultant likelihood of escalation would be
145See Paul Nitze, "The Relationship of Strategic and
Theater Nuclear Forces," International Security, Fall 1977,
122-132.
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decreased. President Reagan echoed these sentiments when he
called on the United States:
to take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional
military conflict escalating to a nuclear war by improving
our non-nuclear capabilities. America does possess-now-
the technologies to attain a very significant improvements
in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear
forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we
can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet
Union may have to threaten attack against the United
States and its allies.' 46
The response to this challenge involved applying
technology to moving "weapons of perceived disutility, that
is, weapons whose effects are sometimes indiscriminate, into
the region of perceived utility, that is, where the effect is
more discriminate."u1 47  As a result, a premium has been
placed "on autonomous, long-range standoff weapons as well as
continuous, all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance. ' 14
Paul Kozemchak's view of the potential contributions of
advanced conventional weapons in defending Europe is
noteworthy:
The technologies of precision and discrimination can
strengthen U.S. guarantees to allies. The United States
can decrease its reliance on incredible, apocalyptic
bluffs while increasing the number of limited, nonsuicidal
14 6U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1983), Ronald
Reagan, address to the nation, March 23, 1983, 443.
14 7Thomas Welch, "Technology Change and Security," The
Washington Quarterly, Spring 1990, 114.
14 
,Joseph Pilat and Pe.ul White, "Technology and Strategy
in a Changing World," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1990,
82.
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U.S. and NATO responses to attack. The United States can
also increase the price that the aggressor must pay to
meet its attack objectives. Because the attacker's
preparations would be greater, U.S. warning would be
increased, and the cost to NATO to respond to ambiguous
warning would be less."'
While Europe will continue to play a major role in U.S.
military planning, non-European conflicts will increasingly
become more important to military planning. According to
Chuck Vollmer,
As the likelihood of superpower conflict in Europe recedes
and the arms control process gains momentum, it is
important to remember that our world has not become an
intrinsically more peaceful one.150
Advanced conventional weapons offer a more credible deterrence
threat against non-nuclear regional powers, and one more in
keeping with the American way of war, than nuclear weapons,
whether tactical or strategic. Moreover, even against a power
that has developed, or is developing, weapons of mass
destruction, non-nuclear responses would be preferred if they
are deemed to be sufficient to respond to the threat.
B. DETERRENCE THEORY
Traditional deterrence theory predicts that a challenger
will not be deterred if he expects the probable benefits of
military action to outweigh the probable costs. On the other
14 Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 266.
ir C. D. Vollmer, "The Future Defense Industrial
Environment," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1990, 102.
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hand, deterrence theory predicts that a challenger will be
deterred if the probable costs of military action outweigh the
probable benefits. According to Stein,
In its essence, the theory of deterrence is one of
motivation, but motivation of a singular kind. It asserts
that would-be challengers seek an opportunity to make
gains, that they look for "windows of vulnerability," and
that, when they find them open, they jump through. Only a
credible capacity to deny or punish militarily, to inflict
costs and risks at an unacceptable level, only military
windows that are closed, can dissuade an adversary from
attack."'
Central to the challenger's "cost versus benefits"
estimates is the credibility of the defender's capability and
commitment to defend against the challenger's military actions
and/or punish the challenger for military actions. Stein
writes,
Crucial to a challenger's estimates is the credibility of
a defender's commitment to punish or deny. .
Credibility, in turn, is generally a function of the
challenger's estimate of a defender's capability and
resolve."'
The credibility of the commitment of the defender to defend is
signaled by the defender's forces for active defense - i.e.,
to intercept attacks. The credibility of the commitment to
punish, however, comes from the capability of the defender's
weapons to strike strategic targets deep in the territory of
the challenger and the chali nger's perceptions of the
"'Janice Gross Stein, "Extended Deterrence in the Middle




likelihood that the defender would resort to punishing
weapons. In order to achieve a more complete picture of a
potential challenger's "cost versus benefits" calculation, the
latter capability may well be more important than the former.
According to Huntington,
Unlike deterrence by presence or deterrence by defense,
however, this form of deterrence [deterrence by
retaliation or punishment]"5 3 is not effective simply
because the requisite military capabilities exist; it
requires a conscious choice by the defender to retaliate;
and hence the aggressor has to calculate not only the
defender's capabilities to implement a retaliatory threat
but also the credibility of the threat." 4
If, as according to deterrence theory, credibility plays
a central role in the challenger's estimates, one must ask how
the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 and the lack of
overt nuclear threats against any nation other than the Soviet
Union since the Eisenhower administration have affected the
perceived credibility of American nuclear threats. One could
":'•Military forces can contribute to deterrence in three
ways. First, they may deter by simply being in place and thus
increasing the uncertainties and potential costs to an
aggressor, even though they could not mount an effective
defense [i.e., deterrence by presence]. . . . Second, military
forces can deter by raising the possibility of successful
defense and hence forcing the aggressor to risk defeat in his
effort or to pay additional costs for success [i.e.,
deterrence by defense or by denial] . . . . Third, military
forces can deter by threatening retaliation against assets
highly valued by the potential aggressor [i.e., deterrence by
retaliation or punishment] . This, of course, has been the
classic role of strateqic nuclear forces." Huntington,
"Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in
Europe," 35-36.
"V4Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional
Retaliation in Europe," 36.
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conclude that a leader of an enemy power might consider the
U.S. nuclear arsenal an unusable threat.
1. Extended Versus Direct Deterrence
A number of types of deterrence are possible. Here we
will examine the distinction between extended deterrence and
direct deterrence. Huth and Russett write that "[tihe
defender may threaten military retaliation so as to prevent
attack on his own homeland territory (direct deterrence), or
against a third state or piece of territory (extended
deterrence) .1`5
While the U.S./Soviet Cold War confrontation did
include extended deterrence policies, with U.S. commitments to
protect NATO Europe, Japan, Korea and other countries, direct
deterrence was concurrently taking place for most of the Cold
War. During the Eisenhower administration, a period of
overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority, the United States
threatened "massive retaliation" in response to a conventional
Soviet attack. Such threats were deemed necessary because of
the overwhelming superiority that the Soviet Union possessed
in the conventional arena. With the increasingly large Soviet
nuclear arsenal, however, "massive retaliation" was replaced
by "flexible response." According to Kugler and Zagare,
"[t]his new deterrence stance [flexible response] postulated
"'Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory
Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politic3, July 1990, 474.
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restraint in nonnuclear confrontations and restated the need
to retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack.11'$6
In currently conceivable regional conflicts few
potential challengers to the United States will possess either
conventional superiority over the United States, or nuclear
weapons, much less nuclear weapons with sufficient range to
threaten the United States directly. (Any nuclear power could
conceivably smuggle nuclear weapons into the United States.
The ability for extended-range delivery of nuclear weapons -
e.g., cruise or ballistic missiles - will nonetheless continue
to be held by relatively few states.) It is more likely that
a challenger will threaten an ally of the United States, or a
region vital to U.S. irterests. Thus, it appears that most
cases of deterrence that the United States will face for the
foreseeable future (ten to fifteen years) will be cases of
extended deterrence. Furthermore, because most potential
challengers will not possess conventional superiority or
nuclear weapons, the principles of proportionality and
discrimination (and other political and strategic
considerations) will restrain the United States from
threatening nuclear responses against non-nuclear challengers
because of the perceived probable outcomes of nuclear weapons
strikes.
"'Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, eds., Exploring the
Stability of Deterrence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1987), 2.
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Thus, in light of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, and the rise in potential regional conflicts that the
United States will be concerned with, one must ask if the
deterrent effect of nuclear weapons will play a significant
role in regional conflicts. For, as Eliot Cohen has observed,
"[i]t would be a terrible mistake to think that the elaborate
and arid logic of nuclear deterrence that operated between the
superpowers will continue to hold elsewhere.'1'1 7
It must be assumed that U.S. public opinion (at least
the elite and informed public) would pressure the government
to adhere to the principles of proportionality and
discrimination. A good description of the principles of
proportionality and discrimination appears in The Challenge
of Peace. According to the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops,
Response to aggression must not exceed the nature of the
aggression. . . . Moreover, the lives of innocent persons
may never be taken directly, regardless of the purpose
alleged for doing so. To wage truly "total" war is by
definition to take huge numbers of innocent lives. Just
response to aggression must be discriminate; it must be
directed against unjust aggressors, not against innocent
people caught up in a war not of their own making.`•
The Persian Gulf War is illustrative of the restraint
that has governed Western planning. Some top U.S. officials
"
17Eliot Cohen, "The Future of Force and American
Strategy," The National Interest, Fall 1990, 4.
""The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The
Challenge of Peace God's Promise and Our Response, a Pastoral
Letter on War and Peace, 3 May 1983, 46.
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made ambiguous remarks declining to rule out the possible use
of nuclear weapons against Iraqi forces in retaliation for
chemical or biological weapons use. It appears, however, that
the use of nuclear weapons was in fact ruled out. The decision
not to use nuclear weapons was publicly acknowledged by some
senior U.S. officials. The officials said, "It Ihe decision not
to use 'weapons of mass destruction' in the Middle East crisis
reflects high confidence in the overwhelming firepower of U.S.
conventional forces, plus a desire not to compound the already
unpredictable political consequences of a potential military
conflict. 119  And a senior military official, speaking on
condition of anonymity, replied to the moral comparison of
Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons to end World War II,
replied as follows:
The world is a more complicated place now, and the
consequences of using tactical nukes -- some of which are
unpredictable -- outweigh their military utility."'°
The most overt pledge not to use nuclear weapons in the
Gulf War came from President Mitterrand of France. He stated
that the coalition "must not use chemical weapons. We have a
conventional means that will permit us to defend ourselves and
to make law triumph, but we must not succumb to this will to
reply on the same level . . I exclude it. Neither chemical,
"'
5
•R. Jeffrey Smith and Rick Atkinson, "U.S. Rules Out




nor bacteriological, nor nuclear arms . . . to use arms of
these types would be a retreat towards barbarism that I
refuse."' 6 1 Clearly, none of the Western coalition members
believed that nuclear weapons use was either needed or
beneficial. Thus, the West, and the United States in
particular, showed once again its reluctance to use nuclear
weapons.
It must be assumed that potential adversaries of the
United States recognize the American public's desire to adhere
to the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Such
adversaries probably also recognize that the United States has
long refrained from threatening nuclear weapons use against
non-nuclear powers. Clearly, in light of political
inhibitions in the United States against unnecessary
collateral damage and the absence of historical cases since
the Eisenhower administration of the U.S. threatening non-
nuclear nations with nuclear weapons use, leaders of emerging
regional powers could be expected to consider American nuclear
threats incredible. In view of the discriminate nature of
advanced conventional weapons, and the recent example of
effective use of advanced conventional weapons in Operation
Desert Storm, advanced conventional weapons can fulfill the
principles of proportionality and discrimination and thus make
their threatened use credible to potential challengers.
16 1Francois Mitterrand, 7 February 1991, in Le Monde, 9
February 1991, 8-9.
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In other words, it is probable that the United States
would refrain from nuclear weapons use because of the moral
implications of killing innocents. The proven capability of
advanced conventional weapons (with their effectiveness
recently demonstrated in the Gulf War) and the ability of the
United States to employ those weapons with relatively little
negative response internationally or domestically reinforce
their deterrent value. Paul Kozemchak writes:
The West can end the balance of terror if it chooses.
Advances in the technologies of precision, discrimination,
and control mean the West can choose not to rely on the
incredible threat of indiscriminate destruction of
innocent civilians to deter war. The West can choose a
strategy that protects and defends its values, not one
that is at odds with them.16 2
2. Past Failures of Conventional Deterrence and So-Called
"Nuclear Deterrence Successes"
Many analysts point to past failures of "conventional
deterrence" as evidence for the relatively low utility of it.
Huntington writes,
In the past, conventional deterrence has usually meant
deterrence by denial, and the frequency of wars in history
suggests that this conventional-denial deterrence was not
effective. Nor has it been effective in the modern era.
John Mearsheimer identified twelve major instances of
conventional deterrence between 1938 and 1979. In two of
these cases, deterrence worked; in ten, deterrence
failed.' 3This 83.7 percent failure rate for deterrence
by conventional defense after 1938 contrasts rather
"-Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 261.
"'•John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) 19-20.
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markedly with the zero failure rate for deterrence by
nuclear retaliation for a quarter century after 1945.64
One must note, however, that it is difficult to determine when
deterrence (conventional or nuclear) actually works. According
to Lebow and Stein, "problems are particularly acute in
testing theories of deterrence because of the difficulties
inherent in identifying deterrence successes, which leave few
if any behavioral traces, and of inferring the intentions of
would-be challengers. 11165
Furthermore, one must question if nuclear weapons
possession automatically translates into credible deterrence.
Does the possession of nuclear weapons alone deter attack by
non-nuclear states on vital interests of nuclear states, or
the nuclear state itself? The answer seems to be "no." China
attacked U.S. forces in Korea. Iraq fired Scud missiles
against Israel, a state considered to be a nuclear power.
While the United States was not threatened with its
own annihilation when trying to deter a non-nuclear aggressor
(i.e., China during the Korean War), many self-inhibiting
factors existed, such as the desire to keep collateral damage
to a minimum and the fear of crossing the nuclear threshold,
.
64Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional
Retaliation in Europe," 38.
"ý6 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence:
The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics, April 1990,
336. They also reclassify a number of possible deterrence
cases that Huth and Russet classified; Lebow and Stein do not
come up with one case involving a nuclear power that they
classify as a deterrence success.
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that restrained the United States from initiating nuclear
weapons attacks. Therefore, the United States could not bring
effective retaliatory weapons to bear on the enemy. 166 These
"self-inhibiting" factors presumably are well known to
potential adversaries of the United States. U.S. nuclear
threats, except under the most extreme circumstances,
presumably would be considered incredible by many potential
adversaries. During Operation Desert Storm, however, highly
effective and discriminate extended-range conventional
weapons, such as the Tomahawk (TLAM) cruise missile and the
Standoff Land Attack Missile (a variant of the Harpoon with a
published range of 100 Km167), were used to attack the Iraqi
military and political apparatus.
3. Escalation Control
Most, if not all, American policy-makers would rather
resnond to crises with nonnuclear alternatives, in order to
avoid crossing the nuclear threshold. The belief is that in
this way the United States might avoid escalation to nuclear
weapons employment. "The nuclear threshold is widely seen as
"lb6During the Vietnam War the popular perception that
American bombing campaigns were indiscriminate caused the
Johnson Administration to refrain from bombing Hanoi where
many of the most important political and military targets
existed. See Clodfelter, "Restraints and results 1965-68, " in
The Limits of Air Power, 117-146.
167Duncan Lennox and Arthur Rees, eds., Jane's Air-
fLaiinched Weapons, (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group,
1989), update edition 7, under Harpoon/USA.
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very important. To cross the threshold by initiating the
first use of nuclear weapons would be a salient and difficult
decision.""1 68  Against a nuclear adversary the crossing of
the nuclear threshold would be considered even more serious.
In a confrontation with a nuclear power, advanced conventional
weapons strikes could be used, while retaining the ultimate
threat of U.S. nuclear response. Thus, advanced conventional
weapons offer a highly effective rung on the escalation ladder
short of nuclear war.
Some would argue that the use of nuclear threats
against non-nuclear powers would encourage these non-nuclear
powers and others to seek their own nuclear forces. If,
however, the United States did not rely on nuclear threats
against non-nuclear powers, the belief is that there might be
less incentive for non-nuclear powers to pursue their own
nuclear capability. Such was the reasoning behind the U.S.
pledge, in 1978, not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear powers who had signed the NPT or any comparable
internationally binding commitment."
""bdStuart Croft, "Military Technology Innovation and
Stability," Futures, October 1989, 472.
1'"See Cyrus Vance, statement to the U.N. Special Session
on Disarmament, 12 June 1978 cited in United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements, 1982 edition, 87. (see footnote 68)
91
C. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
In the past few decades a number of analysts have written
on conventional deterrence. For the most part these analysts
concluded that reliance on conventional deterrence was
foolhardy. As Richard Betts wrote, "I accept the case for
improving conventional options, but challenge reliance on
conventional deterrence.""17  It is important to note that
almost all the authors who took this position were considering
conventional deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, analysts such as Betts and Mearsheimer 71 viewed
attempts at increased conventional deterrence only in light of
Western attempts to increase NATO's conventional defensive
capabilities. In other words, those analysts assumed only
improvements in the ability to deter through defense or to
deter by presence. Nuclear deterrence, though, also is
based on deterrence through the threat of retaliation. With
the improvements in precision, range, discrimination, and
destructive effectiveness that new advanced conventional
""Richard Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive
Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," World Politics, January
1985, 154.
"I7•Mearsheimer doesn't even consider "Long-range
[Precision Guided Munitions] PGMs such as the cruise missile
that can strike important targets in an opponent's rear. "
His sole emphasis is on tactical battlefield weapons, such as
anti-tank weapons. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence,




weapons offer, conventional deterrence too can rely on the
threat of retaliation or deterrence by punishment. According
to Huntington,
Deterrence without retaliation is weak; retaliation
through escalation [to the use of nuclear weapons] is
risky. Conventional retaliation strengthens the one
without risking the other.' 73
Many who warn against reliance on conventional deterrence
argue that while the capability of conventional weapons has
increased it is not capability that plays the significant role
in determining the deterrent effect of a weapon. Betts argues
that:
Much analysis of conventional deterrence is purely
military in content, based on capabilities. Whether given
capabilities deter, tempt, or provoke attack is highly
dependent on political factors-especially the nature of
the potential attacker's motives and beliefs. Depending
on those factors, increased NATO capabilities could be
superfluous, sufficient, or counterproductive to
deterrence .174
Betts, however, misses the whole point of his own
argument; increased conventional capabilities could also
strengthen deterrence. Just as the attacker's beliefs and
motives can cause increased conventional capabilities to be
superfluous or counterproductive, the potential attacker's
motives and beliefs can cause nuclear deterrence to be of very
little use, especially if the potential attacker believes that
17
'Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional
Retaliation in Europe," 41.
,
74Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty
and Policy Confidence," 154.
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U.S. interests are not sufficient to warrant nuclear weapons
use. While many analysts point to the awesome destructive
power of nuclear weapons as a psychological factor making
nuclear weapons of greater utility than conventional forces in
deterring an opponent, the fact that nuclear weapons are
perceived as so destructive may cause the United States to
refrain from their use, and cause many potential adversaries
to look at nuclear threats as incredible. Thus, as William
Perry notes,
This new conventional military capability adds a
powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to
deter war. While it is certainly not as powerful as
nuclear weapons, it is a more credible deterrent,
particularly in regional conflicts vital to U.S. national
interests.175
Why is the new U.S. conventional capability a more
credible deterrent? Nuclear threats have lost credibility,
while there has been a fundamental change in the capability of
advanced conventional weapons to strike strategic targets deep
in an enemy's territory and offer a probability of kill
comparable to a nuclear weapon. Conventional weapons are,
also, more politically and militarily useable because of thei-
greater discrimination and damage-limitation as well as t.ieir
perceived ability to contribute to escalation control. Edward
Rhodes writes that
successful deterrence requires coercive power. . . . [and]
there are two necessary conditions for the existence of
(?EWilliam Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign
Affairs, Fall 1991, 67.
94
coercive power;. . first, the opponent must be
coercible. . . . second, for coercive power to exist the
coercer must have the capacity credibly to commit himself
to the effective coercive strategy."7 6
In view of the U.S. history of non-use of nuclear weapons
in Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East, and the stated U.S.
policy of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
nations under certain conditions, many potential adversaries
may well not perceive American nuclear options as credible
threats. Furthermore, the success of conventional attacks in
Desert Storm, especially extended-range weapons, may cause
future adversaries to be more fearful of conventional strikes.
One must remember that an adversary is deterred by his risk
assessment.177
The Carter Administration came to the conclusion that what
would deter the Soviet Union was not necessarily the same as
what would deter the United States. The Carter administration
introduced the "countervailing strategy." The Reagan
administration continued to rely on the "countervailing
176Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1989), 83-85, emphasis in the original.
177Some leaders may not take military capability or
credibility into account according to the criteria favored by
those who would deter them. These leaders, then, would not be
deterred by nuclear weapons or advanced conventional weapons.
According to Stein "Leaders who expect an unfavorable change
in relative capabilities, who fear an attack by others, or who
are unable to absorb a first strike, may decide to use force
even though they see no 'opportunity;' . . . they estimate the
cost of inaction as unacceptable. . . . Under these
circumstances, the action of the defender may well be
irrelevant." Stein, "Extended Deterrence," 330.
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strategy." Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger - Secretary
of Defense during most of the Reagan administration (until
November 1987) - defined the strategy as "the threat to
destroy what the Soviet leadership values most highly: namely,
itself, its military power and political control capabilities,
and its industrial ability to wage war."' 78 Many argue that
Third World leaders also value themselves and military power.
The theory of omni-balancing suggests that Third World leaders
value themselves and their military power and political
control, even to the exclusion of their people.'79 If the
theory is right, advanced conventional weapons must be
capable of attacking an emerging power's leaders, military
power, and political apparatus. To be credible, though, the
challenger must view the likelihood of U.S military use of
such weapons against its leaders, military power, and
political apparatus as probable. Only if these two conditions
are met can a weapon be considered effective as a deterrent
threat. Thus, if advanced conventional weapons offer both the
capability to threaten the leadership and military and do so
in a credible manner, they would have to be seen as effective
deterrent threats.
"
7 8Casper Weinberger, Department of Defense Annual Report
for FY 1987, 75, cited in Scott Sagan, Moving Targets,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 13.
17 9For a further discussion of the Omni-balancing theory
see Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World
Politics, January 1991, 233-256.
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D. SUMMARY
Nuclear deterrence has declined in utility. It is
therefore necessary for the United States to develop weapons
that enhance conventional deterrence. Since advanced
conventional weapons are more politically and morally usable
than nuclear weapons, they potentially offer greater
deterrence capability than do nuclear weapons, at least in
regional conflicts that do not involve nuclear powers.
Advanced conventional weapons are politically and morally more
usable because they offer relatively high assurance of lower
American casualties, do not cross the nuclear threshold, and
limit damage to noncombatants of the opposing nation. In
other words, they satisfy the principles of proportionality
and discrimination, while also lessening the chances for
American casualties. The greater usability of advanced
conventional weapons and the increased capability of these
weapons mean that "conventional deterrence" can, and will,
play a significant role in potential confrontations with both
non-nuclear and nuclear powers.
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V. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS
Since 1945, strategic conflict has become synonymous with
nuclear conflict. In the past conventional forces were unable
to quickly strike targets deep within the enemy's territory
with sufficiently high levels of assurance of destruction.
With advances in accuracy relatively small conventional
warheads may be used to perform many of the missions -
including strategic missions - previously reserved for nuclear
weapons. With the disincentives the United States faces with
respect to continued heavy reliance on strategic nuclear
weapons, and the marked improvements in conventional weapons
technologies, it has become increasingly apparent that the
United States can and should increase its reliance on non-
nuclear strategic weapons. According to Carl Builder,
the incentives and opportunities for nonnuclear weaponry
are neither limited in range nor measured in kilometers.
In the next decade or two, it will become increasingly
apparent that nonnuclear weaponry can and should be used
in some of the major military roles now served by
strategic nuclear forces."'
For advanced conventional weapons to be assigned to
strategic missions they will have to be able to strike a wide
range of strategic targets that nuclear weapons are currently
19Carl Builder, Strategic Conflict Without Nuclear
Weapons, (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, April 1983)
R-2980-FF/RC, v.
98
assigned to. Therefore, one must determine (a) whether it is
technically possible to attack a wide range of strategic
targets with advanced conventional weapons (can an effective
conventional warhead be built that would destroy many
strategic targets?), (b)whether it would be militarily
feasible to conduct a strategic campaign with advanced
conventional weapons (can a conventional weapon be built
within size, and range restraints to deal with a significant
amount of strategic targets?), and (c) whether it is
economically feasible to develop advanced conventional weapons
for strategic missions.
This chapter examines the feasibility of using advanced
conventional weapons for strategic missions. Possible
strategic missions for advanced conventional weapons are
examined, as well as missions that are not realistic
potential targets for advanced conventional weapons. Probable
costs of potential advanced conventional weapons versus known
costs of nuclear and conventional alternatives are also
examined.
This chapter does not attempt to conduct a comprehensive
analysis of strategic targets suitable for advanced
conventional weapons. The precise accuracies of current
weapons systems, as well as the potential accuracies of
emerging technologies, are generally well kept secrets. Thus,
it is impossible to comprehensively survey the destructive
possibilities of advanced conventional weapons and the
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vulnerabilities of strategic targets in this forum. Categories
of target types vulnerable to advanced conventional weapons
are discussed, however.
A. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
The technical feasibility of advanced conventional weapons
to conduct strategic missions depends on (1) whether any
strategic targets are susceptible to nonnuclear attack, and
(2) whether long-range nonnuclear weapons can be developed
that would be able to successfully strike those targets. It
seems logical that any man-made structure could be destroyed
if sufficient force were brought to bear on it. As Carl
Builder writes, "[m]ost man-made objects are susceptible to
destruction with a properly placed projectile or explosive
charge. It is only when the destructive device cannot be
properly placed that massing their effects by means of rapid-
fire guns or large warheads, including atomic warheads,
becomes attractive.""' The destruction of hardened concrete
targets during Operation Desert Storm with conventional
munitions demonstrates that Builder is correct.182
"'
1 Carl Builder, The Prospects and Implications of Non-
Nuclear Means for Strategic Conflict, Adelphi Paper No. 200




'For examples of conventional munitions use for the
destruction of hardened concrete targets see Conduct of the
Persian Gulf Conflict, An Interim Report to Congress, 1991.
(See especially "Offensive Counterair," 6-2, and "Service
Rapid Acquisition," 8-1.)
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In the past the relative inaccuracy of weapons meant that
only large nuclear warheads could offer significant assurance
ol destruction. Since ballistic and cruise missiles were the
most survivable way to deliver large yield warheads"'• at
long range, they were regarded as the primary strategic
weapons. With the increase in accuracy, however, a relatively
small warhead can destroy the same target that a larger but
less accurate weapon could destroy. Ample evidence
demonstrates the ability of non-nuclear weapons to destroy
strategic tarclets with the same level of confidence that
nuclear weapons offer. The destructive potential of specific
types of non-nuclear weapons may be greater than that of
nuclear weapons against some targets. Deep underground
targets, however, may be well beyond the destructive
capability of non-nuclear weapons. Destroying deep
underground targets with current nuclear weapons may also be
prohibitively difficult. 84 Above ground hardened targets
may, however, be more efficiently destroyed using nonnuclear
weapons. According to Builder,
While reinforced concrete is highly resistant to large
distributed loads, such as the air pressures create(, by a
nearby explosion, it is quite susceptible to penetration
by devices which concentrate and direct their energy into
the concrete, such as h~pervelocity projec'tiles and
... Nuclear warheads generally have much greater explosive
force, in comparison to conventional warheads, relative to the
weight of the warhead.
P 4See Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 273.
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shaped-charge explosives. An 800-kg shaped charge may be
sufficient to penetrate ten meters of concrete. '5
It would seem that a conventional weapon can achieve the
same probability of kill as a nuclear weapon, if a large
enough warhead can be delivered close enough to the intended
target. If a large enough warhead is placed on or near a
target, the target will almost invariably be destroyed.
Because of weight and range restrictions, it is impossible to
simply add more explosives to a delivery vehicle. "Because
there are limits to the size of the conventional warhead, and
thus to damage to target from blast and overpressure,
nonnuclear strategic weapons must be extremely accurate to be
effective."""'
Nuclear warheads offer large explosive effects compared to
the weight of the warhead. New conventional warhead
technologies try to achieve a larger blast to weight ratio -
fuel air explosives (FAE) and enhanced blast (EB) warheads
fall in this category - or they try to concentrate the blast
towards a very small area - shape charges and insensitive
high explosives designed to utilize kinetic energy to
penetrate the target before exploding fall into this category.
18
'Builder, The Prospects of Non-Nuclear Means for
Strategic Conflict, 11.
18 Myra Struck McKitrick, "Nonnuclear Strategic
Capability: Technology, Strategy, and the Arms-Control
Process," in Kenneth Moss, ed., Technology and the Future
Strategic Environment (Washington D.C.: The Wilson Press,
1990), 25.
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Today the majority of advanced conventional extended-range
weapons are either air-launched or sea-launched cruise
missiles. Some short-range conventional ballistic weapons are
currently available or under production and could be
considered advanced conventional weapons. (For example, the
army tactical missile system ATkCMS, and the Phase II MLRS are
two short-range ballistic systems that incorporate terminal
guidance.) And although the CEPs and warheads on most current
weapons are not sufficient to destroy many hardened targets,
current advanced conventional weapons possess sufficient
accuracy to neutralize "lightly hardened" targets. According
to McKitrick,
For the past several years, the Navy's conventional
Tomahawk land-attack SLCM, with a 1,000-lb warhead and an
operational range of 800 miles, has been providing the
United States with an option for conventional attack
against key air defense targets Potential targets
are early warning radars, ground control interceptor sites
and long-range surface-to-air missiles."-'
Geoffrey Loasby of Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review has
reported that
Current Soviet ballistic and cruise missiles have been
credited with CEP values of 30m, which are more than
adequate to deliver FAE warheads to extended area targets
such as troop concentrations and airbases. The peak
pressures of 20kg/sq cm (285 psi) obtainable at ranges of
15m would be sufficient to severely damage aircraft
shelters and most vehicles. 1 88
"
1
"McKitrick, "Nonnuclear Strategic Capability," 28.
"'Geoffrey Loasby, "Fuel Air Explosive -- the Alternative
to Battlefield Nuclear Weapons?" Jane's Soviet Intelligence
Review, July 1989, 300.
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Significant capabilities to precisely deliver conventional
warheads already exist and potential technologies offer the
promise of near-zero CEPs for both long-range ballistic
missiles and long-range cruise missiles. According to the
report entitled Discriminate Deterrence, "Current technology
makes it possible to attack fixed targets at any range with
accuracies within one to three meters."2 89
The cost of long-range ballistic missiles has been too
high in the past to warrant much research on the development
of guidance systems capable of delivering conventional weapons
directly on target, or very close to it. It is very
difficult, because of the terminal speed of a reentry vehicle,
to make intricate corrections to a ballistic missile's reentry
vehicle. Purely inertial guidance systems offer accuracies of
around 300 feet. With the addition of an external reference
system such as GPS, accuracies of around 150 feet can be
achieved independent of weather or time of day. Even greater
accuracy can be achieved with terminal seekers."'
Work has been conducted on conventionally armed ballistic
missiles to attack time-sensitive targets. Airfields are
suitable targets for ballistic missile attack because
"'SCommission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Fred C.
Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, chairmen, Discriminate Deterrence
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January
1988), 50.
"'Kozemchack, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 270.
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ballistic weapons could provide quick-reaction strikes and
would presumably be more survivable than cruise missiles."'
According to Myra McKitrick, possibilities exist for new
operational concepts involving ballistic missiles:
. . .new types of systems, such as a "hypersonic" glide
vehicle launched, for example by a Minuteman booster,
could be designed to deliver conventional warheads at long
distance, with great accuracy, and with ballistic-missile-
like speed. This system would present a very different
type of problem for terminal defenses, and might be able
to achieve reasonable effectiveness against fairly hard
targets even with a conventional warhead.1 92
Whatever the delivery platform, it is apparent that
conventional weapons can be developed to strike within a few
feet of a selected target. Hardened aircraft shelters are
designed to withstand weapons delivered from above (e.g.,
gravity bombs). A cruise missile, armed with a penetrating
warhead, aimed at the door of an aircraft shelter, conceivably
could penetrate the doors and destroy the relatively soft
targets within (e.g., the aircraft, the personnel, and the
maintenance equipment within the shelter), or at a minimum
damage the shelter's doors, making it unlikely that the
aircraft inside could be utilized prior to the shelter being
retargetted. Similarly, an advanced conventional weapon
delivered on a missile silo might severely damage, if not
"
292See General Andrew Goodpaster, et al., European
Security Study, Report of the Special Panel: Strengthening
Conventional Deterrence in Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1985), 57-64.
192McKitrick, "Technology and the Future Strategic
Environment," 30.
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destroy, the soft-skinned missile within it, depending on the
hardness of the silo and the penetration capabilities of the
weapon. Early-warning radars are relatively easy to destroy
with area submunitions or overpressures from, for example,
FAEs.
Deeply buried command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C31) posts may be difficult for both advanced
conventional weapons as well as current nuclear weapons to
destroy; but C31 posts must communicate with their forces.
Therefore, the communication antennas susceptible to
conventional weapons attack could be targeted.
Furthermoze, with the increased reliance on computers many
hardened sites require substantial environmental control
capabilities to maintain the computers in good working order.
In hot or humid areas the destruction of air conditioning
units could significantly degrade or eliminate the computer
capabilities of C•I sites, rendering the entire CI site
inoperable.
If the personnel in the bunkers were the targets of an
attack, it seems feasible, with a near-zero CEP missile, to
target the ventilation shafts that such bunkers rely on.
While not ensuring the destruction of the personnel in
bunkers, the destruction of a bunker's air supply would oblige
the personnel to seek an alternative air source - presumably
one of the entrances to the bunker. While land-line
communications are used to increase survivability of
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communications capabilities, the Gulf War experience
demonstrated that many critical land-lines can be disrupted
with strikes at key switching facilities and bridges that
carry communication cables.1 93
Thus, while hardened targets exist that are relatively
secure from both current nuclear weapons and advanced
conventional weapons, the missions performed by many of these
hardened targets might be disrupted or stopped with the
judicious placement of appropriate conventional weapons. An
authoritative source has calculated the expected
effectiveness of conventional munitions against several
targets using a 1000-pound munition and various CEPs. The
following table is illustrative of assumptions involving the
number of near-zero CEP weapons required to destroy several
targets:
1'3For a discussion of the Coalition campaign against
Iraqi communications see Eric Schmitt, "Iraq Said to Hide Key
War Center In a Baghdad Hotel for Foreigners," New York Times,
14 February 1991, Al.
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ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TARGETING AND WEAPON ALLOCATION
Number of Number of
Target Type Weapons/Target' Attacks/Target
Airfield Runways 9 3
Railroad Bridges 10(5)/aimpoint 3
Highway Bridges 5(2)/aimpoint 3
POL Pumping Stat. 10(3)/aimpoint 1
Maneuver Units and 5/unit or battalion 3
Artillery Battalions
Mobile Missile 5(2)/launcher 2
SAssumes a 3-meter CEP; the lower number (in parentheses)
would be if a 1-meter CEP weapon were available.194
B. MILITARY FEASIBILITY
Many argue that conventional weapons will never have the
ability to threaten entire cities or societies with the rapid
destruction of which nuclear weapons are capable. However, as
noted in chapter two, the perceived ability of nuclear weapons
to threaten the destruction of an entire city, society, or
even planet is one of the key reasons for the delegitimization
of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, while conventional weapons
may never have the ability to threaten cities or societies
1 4The panel on Standoff Weapons of the Offense-Defense
Working Group, "Extended-Range Smart Conventional Weapon
Systems," a Memorandum for The Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy, Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, chairmen,
Discriminate Deterrence (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, Jan. 1988),48 (Table A.2). Also see p.16.
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with rapid destruction as nuclear weapons can, the operational
nuclear strategy of the United States has not emphasized such
threats. For most of the nuclear age U.S. nuclear employment
strategy has been counterforce in nature. According to
Builder, "although assured destruction figures prominently in
the Western rationale for strategic nuclear forces urban and
industrial targeting may in fact account for only 10-15% of
the total U.S. requirements for strategic nuclear
weapons. "'
If advanced conventional weapons promise sufficient
destruction of strategic targets, as the previous section
argued, the two questions that must be answered are (1)
whether strategic targets can be located and identified with
sufficient accuracy to allow for advanced conventional weapons
attack, and (2) whether advanced conventional weapons will
have a high probability of striking their targets.
Cruise missiles are difficult to detect because they often
fly at altitudes less than 100 feet; they rely on ground
clutter (radar returns associated with terrain features) to
make themselves more difficult to identify. Additionally, the
lower the altitude at which a weapon flies, the closer it can
approach a radar before it will reflect radar returns because
of the curvature of the Earth and the line-of-sight nature of
most radars. Since they are difficult to detect, they are
195Builder, The Prospects and Implications of Non-Nuclear
Means for Strategic Conflict, 15.
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difficult to shoot down. With the advances made in look-down
shoot-down fighter aircraft, cruise missiles will become more
susceptible to attack. Work is underway to incorporate
"stealth" technologies in cruise missiles that would make them
harder to locate. Research and development are also underway
to increase the speed of cruise missiles, which would decrease
the amount of time a low-flying missile could be detected by
radar. "Aerospatiale is attempting to enhance its attack
missile capability in three areas: speed, the most effective
method of penetration; maneuverability, both cruise and
terminal phase; and stealth, important but not paramount."1 6
Large numbers of cruise missiles attacking from several
different directions would make it difficult for the defender
to destroy all of the attacking missiles. Defensive forces
could presumably be overwhelmed by large numbers of relatively
inexpensive offensive missiles. There is also the possibility
that states desiring nuclear weapons would have to spend
additional funds on purchasing defensive weapons, in light of
the advanced conventional weapon threat, that would otherwise
be available to be spent on nuclear weapons research.
It seems likely that fixed or semi-fixed targets will be
susceptible to location and identification with national
technical means. Mobile targets, however, will continue to be
difficult to acquire. It is difficult to deliver a weapon on
"'Charles Bickers, "Limits on Stealth," Jane's Defense
Weekly, 16 March 1991, 397.
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a mobile target before it moves, even if it is found. Long-
range ballistic missiles have flight times of several minutes
(10 to 30 minutes, depending on their range and trajectory),
during which a mobile target might escape. Nuclear weapons
could presumably destroy many mobile targets in the vicinity
of ground zero, but this would presumably require large
warheads, with large associated collateral damage, to
sufficiently ensure the destruction of a mobile target in
motion. Conventional weapons technologies can be used to solve
some of the problems associated with mobile targets, with
smaller warheads and lower costs per delivery vehicle compared
to long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
The concept behind the development of the Tacit Rainbow
missile, designed to destroy radar sites, was that it would be
launched from an aircraft and loiter in the vicinity of a
suspected covert or mobile radar site for up to 40 minutes
until the radar emitted; and then it would strike the target.
It is theoretically possible to build a similar missile that
would loiter in the vicinity of a suspected offensive mobile
missile battery and attack when the target is detected
emerging from its hiding place. Computer logic and sensors to
recognize, for example, a synthetic aperture radar return,
micro-laser radar, or infrared return, or any combination of
terminal sensors, could be used to cue the weapon to strike
its target. It is also theoretically possible to build a
conventional cruise missile with sensors, such as side-looking
i1
radars, to increase the search capabilities of the weapon and
thus find the discriminate target characteristics of its prey
before attacking.
Military feasibility is also dependent on cost. Critics
of advanced conventional weapons point to the relatively high
cost of such weapons. TLAM-C is reported to cost around
$ 1,000,000 per missile"9 7 . According to the Panel on
Standoff Weapons,
Unit missile costs of $500,000 or less should be possible
through requirements management to avoid
overspecification, and the application of a modular design
approach that will support production quantities
sufficiently large to achieve economies of scale."'
Paul Kozemchak writes that "[a] small standoff stealth missile
with accuracy under a few meters and a range of 300 nautical
miles reportedly could be built for $300,000, and a long-range
zero CEP missile for $250,000 to $500,000."'99
The evidence seems to confirm that not only are strategic
advanced conventional weapons technically feasible, but they
are also financially affordable and the cost are competitive
with strategic nuclear weapons systems. (Trident D-5 missile
is reported to average approximately $30 million and the MX
197Ed Magnuson, "High-Tech Payoff," Time, 28 January 1991,
30.
19 8The panel on Standoff Weapons of the Offense-Defense
Working Group, "Extended-Range Smart Conventional Weapon
Systems," a Memorandum for The Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy, 27.
1 
"Kozemchak, "New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear
Weapons," 269.
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Peacekeeper missile is reported to cost approximately $50
million.)2°° Capability, survivability, and costs of
strategic advanced conventional weapons can all be made to
meet military requirements. Costs, in particular, appear
reasonable when one takes the long-term costs of personnel,
production, and maintenance of manned conventional platforms
into consideration, or, as in the case of nuclear weapons,
costs for the cleanup of old nuclear weapons production
facilities and construction costs for new nuclear weapons
production facilities. The relative costs of alternatives to
extended-range conventional weapons make the unit costs of
advanced conventional weapons seem more acceptable.
C. CONCEPTS OF USE AND DEVELOPMENT
Advanced conventional weapons can be viewed in a number of
roles. Four examples of potential roles for advanced
conventional weapons are noteworthy:
1. One can view advanced conventional weapons simply as
substitutes for nuclear weapons, at least against some types
of targets. The near-zero CEP accuracies would be utilized to
strike strategic conventional and nuclear targets. Advanced
conventional weapons would be a means of raising the nuclear
threshold.
...For a discussion of the approximate costs of Trident II
and Peacekeeper missiles see Barry D. Watts, "The Conventional
Utility of Strategic Forces," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn
1991, 183.
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2. Advanced conventional weapons could be used as a
warning to demonstrate the punishment that could be inflicted
on an enemy, without having to resort to nuclear weapons.
According to McKitrick,
With a highly accurate conventional weapon, one or more
well-placed shots as a sign of resolve could have a
psychological impact comparable to a nuclear strike, yet
without the collateral damage. Imagine a cruise missile
with one- to three-meter CEP delivered to a specific
window in the Kremlin, or to a particular corner of Red
Square. 201
3. Advanced conventional weapons could be used to destroy
the infrastructure of terrorist groups. The U.S. retaliatory
strikes against Libya in April 1986 could have been conducted
by advanced conventional weapons. According to Kozemchak,
The use of current technology would have allowed the
United States to destroy the Libyan Central Security
Organization headquarters without damaging the French
Embassy, for example. Quaddafi's command center could
have been destroyed without damaging his tent. Of the U.S.
raid on Libya, Admiral William Crowe, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, said: "No matter how much equipment you've
got, it still takes a lot of guts to keep that aircraft
steady and line up the cross hairs when all kinds of stuff
is coming up around you."' 202 Advanced cruise missiles and
other standoff weapons could make misspent courage less
likely." 3
4. If a large-scale nuclear war were to take place,
advanced conventional weapons could be used to complement the
2°McKitrick, "Technology and the Future Strategic
Environment," 32-33.
2` 2Cited in Russell Watson, John Barry, and John Walcott,
"Reagan's Raiders," Newsweek, 28 April 1986, 26, in Kozemchak,
"New Guidance for Nuclear and Nonnuclear Weapons," 267-268.
::Ibid.
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strategic nuclear arsenal. Because of the decreasing nuclear
inventory, advanced conventional weapons could be used to
target air defense positions on the periphery of the enemy, to
open corridors for manned strategic bombers. With the
shrinking of the U.S. nuclear arsenal it is theoretically
possible that at some point only advanced conventional weapons
will be available for defense suppression missions.
D. SUMMARY
The technical and military feasibility of using advanced
conventional weapons to destroy many strategic targets
previously reserved for nuclear weapons appears certain.
While specific targets remain outside the current or probable
capabilities of advanced conventional weapons, the number of
strategic targets safe from conventional attack is rapidly
shrinking.
Institutional inertia is also beginning to change. U.S.
military leaders are underscoring the advantages that advanced
conventional weapons offer compared to nuclear weapons. As
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
noted regarding President Bush's 27 September 1991
announcement,
I would also point out that the increased capability
associated with conventional weaponry in recent years has,
to some eFxtent, inclined us in the direction of getting
rid of tactical nuclear weapons. We can now do
li5
conventionally much more efficiently things we thought we
could only do with tactical nuclear weapons._ 0 4
Much of the distinction between tactical and strategic
nuclear weapons has been the range of the weapons. Many of the
same types of targets were to be targeted by both strategic,
as well as tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., command and control
facilities, air defense sites, etc.). Advanced conventional
weapons can efficiently strike a broad range of strategic and
tactical targets. The extraordinary capabilities of advanced
conventional weapons technology are even more significant in
the context of the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence and
the remarkable costs associated with nuclear weapons
production facilities and environmental cleanup. The costs of
an advanced conventional weapon like TLAM-C reported to be
$1,000,000 per missile-"" are attractive when compared to the
approximately $30 million for the Trident II D-5 missile arid
the approximately $50 million for the Peacekeeper missile.2 °e
In the future, the reluctance to use nuclear weapons as well
as the declining numbers of nuclear weapons will encourage the
United States to rely more on strategic advanced conventional
weapons.
0 4Transcript of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and
General Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS: News Briefing, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 28
September 1991, 11.
2 05Magnuson, "High-Tech Payoff," 30.
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The previous chapters examined a number of disincentives
against the continued heavy reliance on nuclear weapons by the
United States and incentives for expanding the roles of
advanced conventional weapons. Incentives for the
substitution of advanced conventional weapons for nuclear
weapons include the decreasing utility of nuclear weapons, as
well as the increased technical and military feasibility of
advanced conventional weapons to conduct missions previously
thought possible only with nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons have played, and will continue to play,
critical political-uiiitary roles in U.S. national security
policy - above all, deterrence and war-prevention in relations
with adversaries, and reassurance and extended deterrence in
relations with allies and other security partners.
Congressional and public support for nuclear weapons may,
however, continue to decline; and fundamental changes in the
capabilities of advanced conventional weapons have occurred
that make effective strategic advanced conventional weapons
possible. U.S. military planners must determine how to
accomplish the missions once assigned to nuclear weapons.
This thesis argues that advanced conventional weapons,
designed and utilized as strategic weapons, can substitute for
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nuclear weapons in many, possibly even most, missions
currently assigned to nuclear weapons.
A. UNCERTAINTY OVER THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR
ARSENAL
Military and civilian strategists have historically
counted on the continuing presence of a large American nuclear
arsenal. The assumption was, and to a degree is, that the
overwhelming destructiveness of nuclear weapons ensured the
predominant strategic role of nuclear weapons. Instead, the
shear magnitude of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons
has created both a reluctance to use nuclear weapons and a
strong desire to denuclearize. According to Edward Luttwak,
Even the early fission bombs exceeded the culminating
point of military utility because they were deemed
excessively destructive to be used when less-than-vital
interests were at stake, quite aside from any fears of
retaliation in kind. The result was self-inhibition.) 7
The reluctance to use nuclear weapons has been discussed
in previous chapters. The desire to denuclearize is reflected
in statements and actions by recent American Presidents.
President Jimmy Carter in his Inaugural Speech said the
"ultimate goal" was "the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons from this Earth.",20° President Ronald Reagan,
20'Edward Luttwak, "An Emerging Postnuclear Era?" The
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1988, 9.
208U.S., Presidents Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1977), Jimmy
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addressing the nation on his meetings with Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev, announced that:
We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic
missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the
Earth by 1996. . . . we are closer than ever before to
agreements that could lead to a safer world without
nuclear weapons.209
Recent reflections of the desire to denuclearize include
President Bush's 27 September 1991 announcement concerning
nuclear weapons reductions and the further reductions
President Bush announced in his January 1992 State of the
Union address. President Bush announced on 27 September 1991,
that he had directed that the United States "eliminate its
entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range
nuclear weapons.' Furthermore, the President announced
his decision to eliminate most tactical nuclear naval weapons
and to withdraw and store all nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack
Missiles (TLAM-N). His decision effectively eliminated
much of the tactical nuclear arsenal from the operational
Carter, 1977, Book I, 3.
"
2
°'U.S., Presidents, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1987), Ronald
Reagan, 1986, Book II, 1367.
2 
"President, Address. "Address to the Nation on Reducing
United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," The Weekly





inventory. In the State of the Union address President Bush
announced that:
After completing 20 planes for which we have begun
procurement, we will shut down further production of the
B-2 bomber. We will cancel the small ICBM program. We will
cease production of new warheads for our sea-based
ballistic missiles. We will stop all new production of the
Peacekeeper missile. And we will not purchase any more
advanced cruise missiles. 212
He also announced that he had informed President Yeltsin of
the Russian Federation that if the Commonwealth of Independent
States would eliminate all its land-based multiple-warhead
missiles that the United States would do the following:
We would eliminate all Peacekeeper [MX] missiles. We
would reduce the number of warheads on Minuteman missiles
to one, and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based
missiles by one-third.21
The world has seen drastic changes in the past three
years. Communist regimes have been overthrown in Eastern
Europe. The American-led United Nations coalition achieved an
overwhelming victory, in February 1991, over the military
forces of Iraq. Most significant, though, was the breakup of
the Soviet Union after the failed coup of August 1991. The
changes have caused many to question the continuing validity
of U.S. military strategy. With the disintegration of
America's most capable military threat, non-military national
problems have gained predominance in the minds of many
212 "The State of the Union: Text of President Bush's
Address," Washington Post, 29 Jan 1992, A14.
2 1 Ibid.
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Americans. Economic, social, and environmental priorities are
naturally more urgent when external threats to national
security appear minimal.
Indeed, it seems uncertain whether, in the new military
and political climate that allows the President to drastically
reduce nuclear weapons, Congress and the American public can
be convinced of the need for extensive and costly
modernization of the American nuclear weapons production
capabilities. As the "Reed Report," entitled The Role of
Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order, concludes:
The American public does not want to pay for more than it
believes to be necessary, and in the aftermath of the Cold
War, there are strong, newly vocal sentiments that the
defense budget should drop sharply and quickly
Military programs that are visibly expensive and/or pose
high risks to the environment or health will be notably
affected by grassroots opposition. In this milieu, it will
be more difficult than ever to build and sustain consensus
for modernization of highly visible nuclear forces,
despite the fact that strategic deterrence remains the
intellectual cornerstone of national defense. There will
be a strong public tendency to accept arguments that less
is enough, except where compelling rationales or real
world crises argue to the contrary.2 4
The decision to build new nuclear weapons production
facilities may be delayed indefinitely. Current nuclear
weapons stockpiles will become older, and more costly to
214Thomas C. Reed and Michael 0. Wheeler, The Role of
Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order, January 1992, 15.
Thomas Reed was Secretary of the Air Force from 1976 to 1977.
He was also the chairman of the panel that investigated the
role of nuclear weapons in the new world order. The resulting
report, therefore, is often referred to as the "Reed Report."
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maintain. Thus, the continued viability of a large American
nuclear arsenal may well be in doubt.
B. THE "REED REPORT"
The Reed Report lists a number of "objectives which have
attended the development of the American nuclear posture
during the Cold War era." 2" They have included:
* Maintaining effective deterrence so that a potential
aggressor would conclude that the cost of a nuclear attack
against the United States or its allies or friends would
far exceed any expected gain.
* Contributing to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks on,
or attempted coercion of, the U.S. or its allies or
friends.
"* Fostering stability in its several dimensions.
"* Maintaining the capability, if deterrence fails, to
respond flexibly and effectively to an aggressor's first
strike, so as to limit damage to the extent feasible and
terminate the conflict on acceptable terms.
* Containing further proliferation of nuclear weapons
and advanced delivery systems.
* Negotiating effectively verifiable reductions and
restrictions on nuclear forces.2"
The means to accomplish the stated objectives are by no
means limited exclusively to nuclear weapons. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively determine cause
and effect in political-military relations between states.





nuclear attack on the United States has been effected by
American nuclear weapons. "John Mueller has recently advanced
the hypothesis that nuclear weapons have been essentially
irrelevant: the major powers are no longer prone to war
because (among other things) of their horrific experience with
conventional conflicts during 1914-18 and 1939-45, not because
of their fear of nuclear Armageddon.', 217 On the other hand,
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that since the 1960s
American nuclear weapons threats have been seen as politically
unusable against non-nuclear states. Thus, according to Harry
Summers, "u[in none of the wars of the atomic era had nuclear
weapons been the battlefield determinants that their creators
had prophesied."""21
Advanced conventional weapons, because of their usability,
offer a greater ability than do current nuclear weapons to
respond flexibly and effectively. The employment of most
current surface and air-burst nuclear weapons could cause
significant environmental consequences affecting large
geographic areas.
21John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence
of Major War (NY: Basic Books, 1989). See also Mueller, "The
Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the
Postwar World," International Security, Fall 1989, 55-79,
cited in Patrick J. Garrity, "The Depreciation of Nuclear
Weapons in International Politics: Possibilities, Limits,
Uncertainties," Journal of Strategic Studies, December 1991,
467.
-"'Harry Summers, "Warfare going the conventional way,
Washington Times, 23 April 1992, G-3.
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The United States should seek to reconfigure its remaining
nuclear arsenal in order to take advantage of some of the same
technologies that make advanced conventional weapons possible.
More discriminate nuclear options are possible. If nuclear
weapons are to have a credible future in the United States
military posture, the executive branch must convince Congress
that safe and discriminate weapons can be developed and that
they are needed. The U.S. defense establishment must also
prove that key missions exist that are beyond the scope of
either current nuclear weapons or advanced conventional
weapons.21'
In particular, the United States should use the advances
in weapons accuracy to further pursue earth-penetrating
nuclear weapons. Earth penetrators would be more discriminate
than surface or air-burst nuclear weapons and would complement
strategic advanced conventional weapons. The same
technologies that make strategic advanced conventional weapons
possible could contribute greatly to the ability to reduce
nuclear warhead size while at the same time increasing the
destructive capability of nuclear weapons against deep
underground targets."'
lc See the Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-
Term Strategy, Fred C. Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, chairmen,
Discriminate Deterrence, 57-61.
22 0See Report by the Working Group on Technology,
submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,
Technology For National Security (October, 1988),43-44. Also
see Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None,"
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C. STRATEGIC CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
A strategic weapon-2' is not defined by its explosive
force, its range, or speed of attack. For a weapon to be a
strategic weapon it must not only possess the ability to
destroy a range of strategic targets 222 with relatively high
assurance of success, but its use as a strategic weapon must
be accepted as such. Some branches of the U.S. armed forces,
until very recently, did not accept advanced conventional
weapons as strategic in nature, perhaps partly because of the
large numbers of nuclear weapons. According to Barry Watts,
"SAC [Strategic Air Command] has generally neglected the
development of advanced nonnuclear munitions for its heavy
bombers.,,"
F--r too long military and civilian strategists have
assumed the continued existence of, and willingness to use,
nuclear weapons. Too little thought has been given to the
possibility that nuclear weapons might not be available for
971.
22'See footnote 143 in chapter four.
'
2 2Strategic Targets are targets whose destruction
contribut to the overall war effort. Strategic targets are
those ta:'.ets that are vital to the enemy's overall war
fighting capabilities and/or his will to wage war. Strategic
targets include, but are not limited to, reserve troop
concentrations, supply depots, strategic weapons systems, C3I
sites, military production facilities, sources of raw
materials, transportation systems, and petroleum refineries.
w,"Watts0 "The Conventional Utility of Strategic-Nuclear
Forces," 181.
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use in a major war either because of a lack of weapons or a
reluctance to use them.
Increasingly the United States will find it necessary to
plan for contingencies throughout the world. Many potential
"hot spots" could affect U.S. interests and the interests of
allies, friends, or neutrals. The United States will be
increasingly concerned with confining the effects of strategic
strikes to limited geographic areas, thus avoiding damage to
friendly or neutral nations near the enemy. It will be
politically difficult, if not impossible, to threaten nuclear
weapons use when the environmental effects of nuclear weapons
cannot be confined to the enemy's territory. This is
especially true when more discriminate alternatives are
available. According to the Reed Report,
With the advent of near zero CEP stealthy weapons, multi-
spectral intelligence, and improved warhead lethality, it
is now possible to launch non-nuclear strikes on C31,
defenses, and (if desired) leadership. Such capabilities
could be very useful in escalation control. The same
capabilities could be effective in contingencies involving
small numbers of weapons launchers, manufacturing
facilities, or storage sites in the target state. The
Gulf War also focused attention on the need to attack
specific sites like bunkers or nuclear facilities with
massive but geographically confined force. 224
Advanced conventional weapons can and should be used as
strategic weapons, especially in the case of extended
deterrence. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, can and
should continue to fulfill strategic missions. In November
2 2 4Reed and Wheeler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the
New World Order, 33-34.
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1991, NATO's heads of State and Government approved a new
strategic concept that reaffirmed the traditional war-
prevention purpose of NATO nuclear forces. According to the
new concept,
Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO
provide an essential political and military link between
the European and the North American members of the
alliance. . . . These forces need to have the necessary
characteristics and appropriate flexibility and
survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective
element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war.-2
Increasingly, however, many are claiming that the only
credible mission for current strategic nuclear weapons will be
deterrence of direct attack on U.S. territory. Nuclear
weapons will continue to be used for extended deterrence to
prevent aggression against Western Europe, but advanced
conventional weapons can and should play a larger (and more
credible) role in reinforcing the U.S. commitment - both
nuclear and conventional - to defend Europe.
D. SUMMARY
Military organizations throughout history have failed to
recognize when a weapon has lost most of its military
significance. According to Edward Katzenbach,
The persistence of the horse cavalry in the face of
several developments in weapons technology and the
experiences of two world wars stands as testimony to the
strength of organizational survival as a motivation. .
If the cavalry were deprived of its cold steel, would it
2"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," 7 November
1991, paragraph 56.
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lose that fine edge of morale, that elan without which of
course it simply would not be "cavalry," no matter what
its mission? 2 6
Just as the horse cavalry lost its significance,
relatively indiscriminate nuclear weapons have lost, or soon
will lose, a significant portion of their political and
military utility. U.S. strategic planners must recognize and
adjust to this trend, which has been apparent for several
years.
Military planners must evaluate the kinds of targets that
can be attacked with advanced conventional weapons. For those
targets that cannot be attacked with current advanced
conventional weapons the U.S. military must establish
requirements for the development of discriminate forces that
can effectively strike those targets. Only when strategic
planners accept advanced conventional weapons as strategic
weapons will they truly be strategic.
With current and foreseeable advances in advanced
conventional weapons technologies, the United States can
continue its policy of working towards the drastic reduction
of nuclear weapons throughout the world.) 27  Non-lethal
22
'Edward Katzenbach, "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth
Century: A Study in Policy Response," Public Policy, 8 (1958),
120, 122.
22 7See President, Address. "Address to the Nation on
Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons," The Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (30 September 1991) vol.
27, no.39, 1348. and "The State of the Union: Text of
President Bush's Address," Washington Post, 29 Jan 1992, A14.
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technologies such as lasers that are designed to destroy
radars and communication equipment22' are illustrative of
other advanced nonnuclear options that should be pursued
conceptually and technically. Drastic reductions in the
number of nuclear weapons around the world would tend to favor
the United States, especially if the U.S. further developed
strategic advanced conventional weapons. The United States
co-ld claim superiority in strategic advanced conventional
weapons. Interestingly, Secretary of Defense Cheney wrote in
February 1992 that "No country is our match in conventional
military technology and the ability to apply ic.""
Few nations other than the United States have all of the
necessary elements to use advanced conventional weapons for
strategic purposes. Few nations possess the intelligence
collection systems, the command and control systems, and the
financial and technical wherewithal to effectively uti-L,.--e
advanced conventional weapons for strategic purposes.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
It has long beam recognized that it would be highly
desirable for the United States to diversify its long-range
'26See Barbara Opall, "Pentagon Units Jostle over Non-
Lethal Initiative," Defense News, 2 March 1992, 6, -,,, -,, d
"Pentagon Eyes Minimum Lethality Weapons," Aerospace Da_-_y,
6 March 1992, 377.
2.
'9Dick Cheney, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense
to the President and the Congress (Washington D.C. : Government
Printing Office, February 1992), vi.
129
strike options with systems less destructive and less
politically problematic than nuclear weapons. This thesis
argues that advanced conventional weapons are not only
credible but also feasible elements of a more diverse and
flexible strategic posture.
With respect to arms control the United States should
pursue the reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the world.
The United States must seek to at least maintain nuclear
parity with the next largest nuclear power - that currently
being the former Soviet Union. According to the Reed Report,
"The U.S. arsenal should retain parity with the nuclear forces
of the former USSR, and also must maintain a substantial
margin over the other world nuclear powers . . . While
seeking nuclear weapons reductions the United States must
resist any constraints on advanced conventional weapons. The
1987 INF Treaty eliminated U.S. and Soviet ground-based
intermediate-range missiles, but it also deprived the United
States of the option of deploying conventionally armed ground-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles in the relevant range
categc-ies. 23 ' The same mistake must not be made in future
nuclear arms reduction negotiations.
23
"Reed and Wheeler, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the
New World Order, iv.
231See Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Unz4n of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of
Their Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Significant incentives and sufficient means exist for the
United States to further develop advanced conventional weapons
to accomplish missions previously reserved for nuclear weapons
on both the tactical and strategic levels of warfare. This
conclusion is based on a survey of (a) apparent iiz:fntives
for an increased reliance on advanced extended-range
conventional weapons, (b) potential capabilities and
limitations of such weapons, and (c) possible strategic
implications of an increased emphasis on such weapons.
A. INCENTIVES FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Incentives include (a) the delegitimization of nuclear
deterience, (b) environmental, technical, and safety concerns
associated with nuclear weapons, (c) the declining credibility
of threats to use nuclear weapons in military operations, and
(d) the more credible threat of discriminate advanced
conventional weapons.
Moral, political, and environmental concerns about the
use, storage, and production of nuclear weapons have created
a reluctance to rely on nuclear weapons employment threats and
* desire to denuclearize. The thesis concludes that nuclear
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weapons strike plans of certain types exceed the limits of the
traditional Western "just war" principles of proportionality
and discrimination. Most Americans believe warfare beyond
these limits is morally and politically unacceptable.
Environmental-damage prospects associated with nuclear war
such as the "nuclear winter" theory, although shown to be
"poor science," have caused concerns for some Americans.
Moreover, the dilapidated state of U.S. nuclear weapons
production facilities and the administration's initiatives in
1991 and 1992 to cut back U.S. nuclear capabilities raise
uncertainties about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons
programs.
The thesis also concludes that the deterrent effect of
nuclear weapons ha.s probably diminished as a result of the
reluctance to use nuclear weapons. Advanced conventional
weapons are more usable than nuclear weapons and therefore
more credible as deterrent threats. Thus, if (as most
deterrence theories claim) the credibility of threats is
crucial, discriminate advanced conventional weapons clearly
reinforce deterrence. Advanced conventional weapons offer the
ability to directly threaten strategic targets deep within an
enemy's territory, including enemy leaders themselves, without
the fear of causing significant collateral damage.
Furthermore, advanced conventional weapons reduce the risk of
U.S. casualties in the event of conflict. Advanced
conventional weapons offer the possibility to threaten the
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destruction of industrial, military, and political targets
discriminately and effectively.
B. CAPABILITIES OF ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
With sufficient accuracy, almost any man-made target can
be destroyed with conventional weapons. Current warhead
technology allows for the destruction of most types of
strategic targets232 with weapons of 1 to 3 meters CEP
accuracy. Currently available guidance technology can already
provide this level of accuracy. Thus, the ability to strike a
significant range of strategic targets with non-nuclear
warheads already exists.
The cost of advanced conventional weapons is competitive
with nuclear weapons when one considers the cleanup and
modernization costs for nuclear weapons production facilities
- to say nothing of the problem of nuclear waste disposal when
warheads that are no longer needed must be dismantled.
Advanced conventional weapons can be acquired at a cost of
12 As noted in chapters four and six, strategic targets
are targets whose destruction contribute to the overall war
effort. Strategic targets are those targets that are vital to
the enemy's overall war fighting capabilities and/or his will
to wage war. Strategic targets include, but are not limited
to, reserve troop concentrations, supply depots, strategic
weapons systems, C3I sites, military production facilities,
sources of raw materials, transportation systems, and
petroleum refineries. (See footnotes 143, 221, and 222.)
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$500,000, according to one analyst, to $800,000 for the TLAM-C
Block III, with proper incentives for manufacturers."
C. SUMMARY
In current political circumstances, the need for strategic
nuclear weapons appears minimal. As long as actual and
potential nuclear threats to U.S. and allied security exist,
however, the U.S. must maintain sufficient nuclear forces to
ensure credible central and extended deterrence. Political
circumstances are subject to relatively rapid change, and
strategic nuclear forces cannot be promptly improvised.
It is militarily and politically imperative that the
United States also find discriminate, useable, and credible
alternatives to nuclear threats. Advanced conventional weapons
can be used to threaten the destruction of a broad range of
strategic targets. Advanced conventional weapons, because they
are useable, are more credible and effective deterrent
threats, especially in the regional conflicts that the United
States may increasingly be concerned with.
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